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The Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group are fighting for legal recognition of their property 
rights with respect to their unceded lands located in British Columbia, Canada.  In 
examining the available literature surrounding the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission, it is clear that the domestic processes for negotiation have been 
structured in such a way so that Aboriginal narratives and laws have been foreclosed 
upon by the legal architecture and language that underwrites the negotiations between 
Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal governments. The Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group’s 
decision to apply to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rather than 
continue with domestic remedies through the courts or treaty-making process 
represents a chance to compare the two legal spaces. The comparison is made 
through the use of a praxis of jurisdiction, which is a technique that can explore the 
ways in which person, places, or events make contact with the body of law. The focus 
of such a jurisdictional endeavour is to use the magnifying lens of jurisdictional thinking 
to uncover the landscape of legal practice as it is manifest in the two Commissions. 
Specifically, jurisdictional thinking is about the quality of lawful relations, bringing in to 
focus the texture of the relationships between the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group and 
Non-Aboriginal governments. The Inter-American Commission generates very 
different opportunities for the articulation of legal relationships, and as such the 
jurisdictional perspective uncovers the need for Canada to take seriously its 
commitment to an ethic of responsibility in its conduct of lawful relations, and a 
pressing need to reconfigure the mechanics of domestic law to make room for different 
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CHAPTER 1: A PRACTICE OF JURISDICTION 
 
I. Introduction  
 
By choosing an alternative jurisdiction outside Canada and bringing their arguments 
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Hul’qumi’num Treaty 
Group (HTG) has the opportunity to engage with a different meeting place for laws, 
and initiate a different texture to the speech between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal 
governments. Through a re-description or praxis of jurisdiction, the narrative of the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group can be reconfigured so as to unveil how the different forms 
of jurisdiction provide a scaffolding for the shape of lawful relations between the crown, 
the province, and First Nations communities. If Canada is to approach the conduct of 
law from an ethic of responsibility proceeding from and evaluation of the quality of 
lawful relations through jurisdiction, it will be evident that the underlying jurisdictional 
machinery will need to be re-imagined. As it stands, the jurisdictional formulations of 
the domestic Canadian architecture silence the narratives of indigenous nationhood 
without needing to say a word.  
 
At the heart of this endeavour is a question about the utility of engaging with a critical 
approach to law through the method of thinking with jurisdiction. Can a jurisdictional 
approach be used to provide new or different ways of thinking and speaking about the 
space in which Canadian land claims issues can be argued? Motivating this issue is 
the plight of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group and their efforts to secure rights and 
demarcation of their traditional lands in the face of widespread encroachment and 
environmental degradation. In the face of this, the notion of thinking with jurisdiction 
has the possibility of drawing attention to the ways in which non-aboriginal 
governments foreclose on concepts of Indigenous law and draw a perimeter around 
available legal spaces and remedies - undermining meaningful relations between First 
Nations in Canada and non-aboriginal governments. In uncovering some of the 
underlying jurisdictional architecture and the mechanisms for authorising that 
architecture, it becomes more evident why Canadian land claims endeavours have 
been less than transformative. By comparing the space made by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and its separate body of jurisprudence, we can gain 
valuable insight in to the alternative jurisdictional arrangements as they are compared 
to those overseen by the British Columbia Treaty Commission.  
 
As one of the central themes of this paper, jurisdiction is a term that will be used 
frequently and take a considerable amount of explanation due to its varied and 
widespread use throughout the document. As a routine legal term, jurisdiction is used 
as a technical concept that describes the capacity for a legal entity to hear and decide 
on a given legal matter. This term covers a considerable amount of the work done by 
legal processes and the varying forms that it can take are not immediately visible 
beyond superficial questions of the conflict of laws. An account of jurisdiction, without 
any elaboration as to its function and metaphysics, might be considered the in the light 
of the authority to speak in the name of the law. However, thinking through jurisdiction 
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not as a static legal detail but as an active engagement provides a different perspective 
on the nuances of jurisdiction. Three formulations of jurisdiction from the perspective 
of its active engagement will be discussed in the following chapters in a way that draws 
attention to the work that a jurisdiction practice does in organising and shaping law 
and lawful relationships. Thinking through these forms of jurisdiction as they interact 
with specific contexts might be considered a praxis of “thinking with jurisdiction”.  More 
specifically, and as we will see in the first chapter, jurisdiction connotes authority. It 
also embodies the speech of law, and in so doing is responsible in some formulations 
for the inauguration of law itself. As Dorsett and McVeigh put it, “jurisdiction engages 
law in a variety of ways. Perhaps most importantly, it both gives us the form and shape 
of law and the idiom of law.”1 Given the work that jurisdiction does through its various 
formulations, applying an ethic of responsibility to thinking with jurisdiction generates 
a productive lens through which to engage with a critical approach to law and evaluate 
the texture and quality of legal relationships.  
 
Shifting briefly away from the jurisdictional framing, this first chapter will introduce the 
legal and political context of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG), whose movement 
through two distinct legal processes is motivated by an effort to secure legal 
recognition and control over their ancestral lands. The context and content of the HTG 
case provides the foundation for examining contemporary land claims process in 
Canada, and marks the only Canadian case that straddles the domestic and 
international jurisdictions - in the technical sense of the word. As the only endeavour 
of its kind, it also begs the question – why appeal to an international commission when 
it has no power to compel? Jurisdictional thinking may in fact provide an answer.  
 
The chapter will then return to an overview of jurisdiction as a practice and describe 
the turn in academia towards a jurisdictional account of lawful relations and the 
strength of such a multi-pronged approach. This turn to jurisdictional thinking outlines 
how jurisdiction as a praxis might be useful as a foundation for a critical redescription 
of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group case progression, and the argument that such a 
praxis can provide a foundation for a productive critique of the invisible processes that 
shape the jurisprudence of aboriginal land claims in Canada. This should provide an 
explanation of the use of jurisdictional thinking in the particular context of the HTG 
case.  
 
Having set the stage, the chapter will then introduce the various facets or formulations 
of a jurisdictional account of law and an introduction to some of the terminology. The 
overview divides the approach of thinking with jurisdiction into three perspectives that 
each emphasise an aspect of the work done by a practice of jurisdiction. These forms 
of jurisdiction are grouped loosely into three modes of jurisdiction: Representation, 
Authorisation, and Inauguration. Each are further divided into their main themes or 
approaches, with notions of representation being deconstructed in to four separate 
technologies of jurisdiction: Writing, mapping, categorisation, and precedent.   
 
The second chapter will illustrate the modes and manner of coming in to and being 
with law that is the hallmark of the notion of “thinking with jurisdiction”. From this 
 
1 Shaunnagh Dorsett & Shaun McVeigh, Jurisdiction, (New York: Routledge, 2012)   
[Jurisdiction] at 5. 
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perspective the chapter will examine the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group’s interaction with 
the British Columbia Treaty Commission and the ways in which the three formulations 
of jurisdiction and their attendant themes or technologies shape the processes and 
outcomes of the treaty negotiations. While identifying the ways in which persons, 
places, and events might attach to the existing body of law, a jurisdictional account 
shows how the threshold for the entrance and exit from law is mediated by the 
jurisdictional machinery. Built in to these jurisdictional assemblages is the 
reinforcement of architecture that biases the processes towards an inflexible model of 
law, resulting in the alienation of Aboriginal governments and communities. Most 
evident in the jurisdictional approach to thinking through this process is the absent 
narrative of Aboriginal law.  
 
Chapter Three addresses the technologies of representation, structures of 
authorisation, and questions of inauguration at the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR). It introduces a brief account of how The Commission operates 
before applying a praxis of jurisdiction in order to interrogate how the Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group’s quality of lawful relations changes through the same jurisdictional 
formulations as were identified in the prior two chapters. Despite applying the same 
modes of jurisdiction to the examination of the conduct of legal interaction, we will see 
that the underlying architecture and shaping of law is quite different. The different 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the more 
accessible texts make it easier to establish how the performance of the case on an 
international stage was shaped.  
 
 
Chapter Four makes a direct comparison between the two commissions – the British 
Columbia Treaty Commission and the Inter-American Commission on Human Right – 
through the identified formulations of a praxis of thinking with jurisdiction. It concludes 
that the underlying jurisdictional architectural differences between the two processes 
generate vastly different opportunities for examining the way in which persons, places, 
and events are tethered to the domain of law. Given the flexibility of the method, this 
extends to the notion of attaching ideas and communities to the existing jurisprudence 
through the same jurisdictional mechanisms. It continues to conclude that the ethic of 
responsibility towards the conduct of lawful relations is not evident in Canada’s 
interactions with the Hul’qumi’num Peoples. In order to take seriously that ethic of 
responsibility towards an inclusive Canada and the crown’s fiduciary duty towards First 
Nations communities, the non-aboriginal governments need to re-configure the 




II. The Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group  
 
The Hul’qumi’num indigenous peoples inhabit part of the province of British Columbia 
in Canada and are the plaintiffs in the case against the Government of Canada that 
has been heard by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)2. The 
 
2 Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, “ Petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
 Human Rights submitted by Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group against Canada”,  
Case documents: Petition, Volume 1 (May 10, 2007). [HTG Petition 2007] at 1. 
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main incidents that prompted new action by the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG) 
have been the clear-cutting and deforestation in ancestral Hul’qumi’num lands by 
private forestry and real estate corporations. The destruction of the natural 
ecosystems in these lands impact all aspects of HTG life3. At issues it the ability of the 
HTG to access systems that allow for reasonable and timely protection of contested 
ancestral lands4, alongside the issue that the land ownership itself is still contested5.  
 
Within Canada there is a well-established land reserve system6, which nonetheless 
does not take into account the large tracts of territory traditionally used by aboriginal 
peoples in Canada. Within the province of British Columbia the federal government 
has set up the British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC)7 in conjunction with the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada in order to oversee the British Columbia Treaty Process 
(BCTP)8, which is responsible for negotiating modern-day treaties in B.C.  Further to 
this, the Supreme Court of Canada has tried numerous cases9 concerning Aboriginal 
Title, which is now recognised in Canadian common law10. 
 
3 Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, “Petitioner’s Summary of Presentation to the Inter- American  
Commission on Human Rights During 143rd Period of Session in  relation to Case 
No 12.734 Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v. Canada submitted by the Hul’qumi’num’ 
Treaty Group”, Hearing summary, (October 17, 2011). [Petitioner’s Summary 2011]. 
 
4 IACHR Hearing and Other Public Events “Session: 134 Period of Session; Date:  
Monday, March 23, 2009. Petition 592.07 and Precautionary Measures 110/07 – 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, Canada” online: cidh 
<http://www.cidh.org/Audiencias/134/20.%20P%20592%2007%20y%20MC%20110
%2007%20Hul%20qumi%20num%20Treaty%20Group%20Canada.mp3> [IACHR 
Hearing session 134, 2009]. 
 
5 Murdith McLean, “Robert Morales: Can International Law Move Canada Towards  
Reconciliation?” 19th May 2013, online: youtube 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ak1y6K68vFs>. 
 
6 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5. 
 
7 British Columbia Treaty Commission Act. SC 1995, c.45. Online: <http://laws-
 lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-8.5/>. 
 
8 BC Treaty Commission “Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group” (2017) Online: 
 <http://www.bctreaty.ca/hulquminum-treaty-group>. 
 
9 See generally, Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1998] 1  
C.N.L.R. 14, 153 D.L.R (4th )193, [Delgamuukw], Calder v A.G. (B.C.),  
[1973] S.C.R. 313, 7 C.N.L.C. 91, [1973] 4 W.W. R. 1, 34 D. L. R (3d) 145,  
(S.C.C.) [Calder], R. v Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, [1990] 3 C. N. L. R  
160, [Sparrow]. 
 
10 Canada, Parliamentary Research Branch, Aboriginal Title: The Supreme Court of  
 Canada Decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, BP- 459E (Law and  
 Government Division, Mary C. Hurley, 1998 – Revised 2000) Online: 
 <http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp459-e.htm#(6)>.  




In 1993, six of the Hul’qumi’num First Nations formed the legal entity of the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group for the purposes of treaty negotiations,11 and in 2007 the 
HTG filed a petition with the IACHR regarding the protection of their traditional lands.12  
Why, when there are three distinct land claims mechanisms available in Canada, does 
the HTG need to look outside Canada to the Inter-American commission on Human 
Rights for a legal solution to land disputes in British Columbia? The HTG are asserting, 
among other things, a right to property in their traditional lands in the province of British 
Columbia. The petition to the IACHR also addresses the failure of Canada to 
safeguard and properly demarcate the lands of the Hul’qumi’num First Nations. This 
is inclusive of a failure to effectively consult with regards to the destruction and 
unregulated exploitation in HTG traditional lands – lands that contain historic burial 
sites and locations necessary for the Hul’qumi’num Peoples’ cultural survival. This is 
manifest in the IACHR case as a breach of the right to property in article XXIII, the 
right to culture in article XIII, the right to religious freedom in article III, the right to a 
fair trial in article XVIII, and the right to equality under the law in article II.13  
 
Of note, however, is the fact that an appeal outside of Canada without exhausting 
domestic remedies becomes a question of jurisdiction it a strictly technical sense. The 
initial hearing at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is in fact an 
admissibility hearing where the Canadian government representatives argue that the 
commission does not have the jurisdiction to hear the case because the Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group had not exhausted domestic remedies.14 With respect to the necessity 
of exhausting domestic remedies, the HTG argues from the position of the violation of 
the right to a fair trial and the invocation of iura novit curia15.  In the international context, 
this means that the court is responsible for deciding upon the applicable law and how 
that law is implemented given a review of the facts.16 In this case the IACHR applies 
to its own jurisprudence regarding the special grounds upon which the domestic 
remedies need not be exhausted. 17 
 
 
11 Supra note 2 [HTG Petition 2007] at para 17. 
 
12 Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, “Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Observations of the  
 Merits of the Case: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in relation  
to Case No 12.734 (Canada)” Case Comment, (January 22, 2010). [Case Merits 
Observations, 2010] at para 1. 
 
13 Ibid at para 4. 
 
14Supra note 4, See generally [IACHR Hearing 2009]. 
 
15 Supra note 12 [Case Merits Observations, 2010] at para 4 
 
16 Jo M Pasqualucci. The practice and procedure of the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 154 
 
17 See generally, OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition  
Admissibility: Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Canada, Petition 592-07, Report No  
105/09 (October 30, 2009).   
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As with any endeavour in the international sphere, there is also the problem of 
enforceability, particularly with a case before the Inter-American Commission rather 
than the Inter-American Court18. The human rights appeal of indigenous communities 
to the Inter-American Commission has a well-established history and jurisprudence of 
its own19, however this is a novel direction for the jurisprudence of land claims in 
Canada. The human right to property was explicitly left out of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (CCRF)20 21, and unlike the sui generis nature of Aboriginal 
Title22, the human right to property is not established via the pre-sovereignty existence 
and communal nature of indigenous ownership. 
 
With regards to the form of law created by different jurisdictions, a Canadian court 
case that argues for Aboriginal Title to traditionally occupied lands functions as a 
mechanism for generating a particular type of unique interest in the land based on 
continuous indigenous occupation23. Similarly, a treaty process has the capacity to 
negotiate within the parameters set by the government, and with those parameters the 
possibility of negotiating use rights to resources and authorisation of the transfer of 
fee simple title in the territories that the HTG already consider to be theirs24. 
 
However, as is argued in the submissions to the Inter-American Commission by the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, the progression and advancement of aboriginal land 
claims in British Columbia is hampered by the cultural and political context written in 
to the legal and quasi-legal shaping of the legal relationships25. The HTG represent a 
 
18 See generally, Organisation of American States “Inter-American Commission on 
 Human Rights” (2011) Online:<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp>. 
 
19 See generally, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (2007). Inter-Am Ct HR  
(Ser. C) No. 172, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs; Case of the 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. (Judgment of March 29, 2006). 
Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser. C) No.146, Merits, Reparations and Costs.; Case of the 
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Judgment of August 24, 
2010) Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser. C) No.214, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
 
20 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.1, Part I of the Constitution Act,  
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. Online: 
Department of justice <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-15.html>. 
[CCRF]. 
 
21 Canada, Parliamentary Research Branch, Property Rights and the Constitution,  
BP-268E (Law and Government Division, David Johansen, 1991) Online: 
 <http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp268-e.htm>. 
 
22 Supra note 10 [Delgamuukw Decision Aboriginal Title]. 
 
23 Ibid. see also note 9 [Delgamuukw] at para 112 -115. 
 
24 Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, “Robert Morales: Seeking Justice Elsewhere”  
 February 23rd 2012, online: lrwc <http://www.lrwc.org/video-seeking-justice- 
 elsewhere/>. [LRWC, Robert Morales]. 
 
25 See generally, Supra note 12. [Case Merits Observations, 2010]. 
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minority of the population within British Columbia. The six nations that form the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group are: the Cowichan Tribes, the Chemainus First Nation, 
the Penelakut Tribe, the Halalt First Nation, the Lyackson First Nation, and the Lake 
Cowichan First Nation. Between them they have 6400 members.26 These nations have 
little political clout against large corporations, with whom the provincial government 
has invested part of its pension fund27. The recent deregulation based on the removal 
of the Tree Farm Licence28 in corporate holdings and the resulting widespread clear-
cutting and deforestation in these privately-held lands has caused widespread 
damage to the traditional lands of the Hul’qumi’num, eighty-five percent of which are 
held by the “Big 3” timber corporations29. The six Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group nations 
are among the poorest communities according to the federal government’s 
“Community Well-being Index”. Of the 486 communities surveyed nationwide with 1 
being the most prosperous, the six First Nations scored between 448 and 482.30 
Beyond this, the province of British Columbia refuses to negotiate treaties while 
indigenous groups undergo any other kind of political or legal action. Furthermore, the 
government loans necessary to engage with treaty negotiation can become payable 
as soon as communities exit the negotiation process.31 
 
Arguably, First Nations Peoples in Canada have been discriminated against and 
institutionally marginalised. Without a large population the ‘tyranny of the majority’ is 
likely to continue to hold sway against indigenous communities in general, perpetuated 
by both obvious and not-so-obvious jurisdictional mechanisms. The six Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group nations are at a disadvantage in any type of legal negotiation with the 
state, their norms and laws unrecognised in the formation of the relationships with 
non-aboriginal governments. It is the formation and quality of lawful relations that is 
the organising theme to the notion of ‘thinking with jurisdiction’ that scholars have 
turned to in this past decade as a means of reworking and re-evaluating legal 
relationships, and to that end it is an appropriate means with which to examine the 
progression of the HTG case from its precursor negotiations in the British Columbia 
Treaty Commission process to the case before the Inter-American Commission on 





26 Supra note 12 [Case Merits Observations, 2010] at para 8. 
 
27 Ibid at para 19. 
 
28 Ibid at para 25.  
 
29 Ibid at para 18. 
 
30 Ibid at para 26. 
 
31 IACHR Hearing and Other Public Events “Session: 133 Period of Session; Date:  
 Tuesday, October 28, 2008. Precautionary Measures and Petition 592.07 –  
 Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, Canada” online: cidh  
 <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Audiencias/133/B26HulquminumTreatyGroupCana 
 da.mp3>[IACHR Hearing 2008 Session 133]. 
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III. Jurisdictional Endeavours  
 
The on-going authorship in the emergent field of critical jurisdiction arises out of post-
modern critical theory32. The developing scholarship of jurisdiction encompasses a 
considerable diversity of subject matter within legal studies. As Asha Kaushal notes in 
her 2015 article on the politics of jurisdiction, “there is little scholarship about 
jurisdiction in mainstream legal theory circles and less still that pulls together the 
various threads of scholarship about the subject”33. The consensus is, however, that 
thinking with jurisdiction can be considered a productive lens to examine how law is 
expressed and given shape, revealing what the underlying jurisdictional architecture 
contributes to studies in legal subjectivity34. In the emergent field of jurisdictional 
studies, using jurisdiction as a tool in a critical redescription35 of legal space is useful 
because it allows for a close look at the processes that generate or shape legal 
relationships. It can be used as a methodology to investigate the arrangement of lawful 
relations without referencing notions external to legal scholarship that might situate a 
critique of lawful interactions within the realm of context and content rather than 
process and organisation.  
 
On the surface jurisdiction is most obviously the concept through which law is 
organised. It is the machinery of the legal processes carried out within the nation state. 
However, this machinery not only configures the underlying architecture of lawful 
relations, but also represents the active engagement of law as it attaches persons, 
places, and events to the living tree of common law and jurisprudence. This active 
machinery plays a key role in the critical engagement with law through jurisdiction, and 
further, the use of jurisdiction as a praxis that tethers and creates legal relationships 
is a way of locating space for the meeting of laws, or as Nicholas Blomley explains, 
the interstitial space between law36. Beyond the technologies of jurisdiction, this critical 
engagement also encompasses the metaphysics of jurisdiction, which has 
implications for the threshold at which law operates and the notion of law’s 
inauguration. As Dorsett and McVeigh explain it:  
 
Jurisdiction … encompasses the broadest questions of the authority 
and the founding of legal order as well as the minutest detail of the 
 
32 See, eg, S. Dorsett and S. McVeigh, Jurisdiction (New York, NY: Routledge,2012);  
E. Mussawir, “The Activity of Judgment: Deleuze, Jurisdiction and the  
Procedural Genre of Jurisprudence” (2010) 7 Law, Culture and the Humanities 463. 
 
33Asha Kaushal “The Politics of Jurisdiction” (2015) 78(5) MLR759–792 [Kaushal] at 
  759. 
 
34 Ibid.  
 
35 Sundhya Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: a jurisdictional account of international law”  
(2013) 1:1 London Review of International Law, 63–98. [Pahuja] at 65. 
 
36 Nicholas Blomley, “What Sort of Legal Space is a City?” in A. M. Brighenti eds  
Urban Interstices: The Aesthetics and the Politics of the In-between  
(Burlington: Ashgate publishing group, 2013). 
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ordering of the business of the administration and adjudication of 
justice.37 
 
One of the key strengths of the scholarship around jurisdiction is that it does not have 
a pre-existing ethic that animates the practice of thinking with jurisdiction – beyond 
that of an ethic of responsibility.38 It does not situate a redescription of events, persons, 
places, or facts within a specific perspective as might be expected within a Feminist 
or Marxist account, for example.  
 
As both a strength and a weakness, jurisdiction represents multipronged approach 
that can be applied to a vast array of different contexts. Jurisdiction does not represent 
a unified theory that narrates in a linear direction. It is rather a perspective or lens 
through which a diverse selection of legal relationships can be filtered in order to 
uncover mechanisms, technologies, and assumptions that might initially have been 
obscured. Because jurisdiction addresses the modes and manners of coming into law, 
or the entry and exit from law39 as Asha Kaushal phrases it, this thinking or praxis of 
jurisdiction can be used as a whole or in parts with emphasis on different facets 
according to the situation at hand. This makes the approach exceedingly flexible and 
adaptive while rendering the literature somewhat disparate40 and loosely connected 
on occasion. 
 
Of particular interest, however, is the fact that “thinking with jurisdiction” has the 
possibility to enliven, describe, or create new ways of belonging to law. Because the 
original authorship of the book Jurisdiction by Dorsett and McVeigh focused on the 
quality of lawful relations, there is the prospect within the approach is to take 
responsibility for those encounters in law. Because of the metaphysical bent to 
questions of jurisdiction, this jurisdictional thinking operates at the threshold of law - 
and in that liminal space between the end of one law and the beginning of another is 
the possibility of a different account of the meeting place for laws. 
 
At its foundation, jurisdiction represents the most prosaic ordering of how to do things 
within law; the whole point is that a practice of jurisdiction encompasses the means by 
which persons, places, and events can be tethered to law and the quality of that 
relationship of belonging. This productive lens of jurisdiction is situated within law’s 
mandate and a reshuffling or reworking of existing and historic41 jurisdictions can 
enable new and different formulations of lawful relations. It has the capacity and scale 
to come up with creative re-workings of existing frameworks, making it a truly 
productive mechanism.  
 
 




39 Supra note 33, [Kaushal] at 759. 
 
40 Ibid.  
 
41 Supra note 1 [Jurisdiction]. 
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In order to see how this account of jurisdiction has been beneficial, it is important to 
establish what it means to approach the issues from a critical jurisprudence of 
jurisdiction rather than to simply redescribed existing relationships via a jurisdictional 
lens. Inherent in the practices of authorisation is the notion that there is indeed an 
author. In forming or actioning any practice of jurisdiction, there needs to be an actor 
or instigator. This authorship in the office of the jurisprudent, and paying attention to 
the authority vested in such an office is how Dorsett and McVeigh attach an ethic of 
responsibility to their approach of thinking with jurisdiction. While there is more recent 
literature on the varied use of thinking with jurisdiction and its application in a whole 
host of different situations, an explanation of being critical and a responsibility for the 
conduct of law is best described by the above authors. 
 
The above has given an account of three formulations of jurisdiction that configure it 
as a practice or form of conduct42. These formulations of jurisdiction, however, are not 
in themselves critical. They provide a way to unearth a manner of thinking with law 
and with jurisdiction in a mode that is sympathetic to a close reading of jurisdiction as 
more than just a legal technicality. However, before approaching a critical account of 
jurisdiction it is necessary to investigate the role of language in doctrinal legal writing 
and the office of the jurisprudent as a part of the institutional life of law and jurisdiction. 
This transmission of authority through the office of the jurisprudent and its relationship 
to the visible representation of the jurisdictional technology of written documentation 
links the subsequent discussion of an ethic of jurisdiction to the practices of thinking 
with jurisdiction. 
 
Doctrinal thinking can be conceived of as the principal method of organising legal 
thought, both from the perspective of an appeal to legal science through reason, and 
as the systematic and practical organisation of legal materials. This compilation of 
written legal knowledge is most closely associated with the academic traditions of legal 
scholarship and the official teaching of law. Doctrinal scholarship, then, is fashioned 
to represent the authority of law as it is transmitted through the specific language 
accumulated in the written accounts of law. By way of contrast, a critical thinking 
approach is attuned to the difficulties of law, and for Dorsett and McVeigh, this is a 
specific critical enterprise associated with authority and authorisation.43 
 
A considerable amount of philosophy is devoted to distinguishing between law as it is, 
and law as it ought to be. Pertinent as such a discussion is, it is focused again on the 
content rather than the conduct of lawful relations. McVeigh and Dorsett argue that 
this tension between is and ought obscures the nuances of legal interpretation. A focus 
on content does not cede anything the work done by the practice of legal writing in 
representing what law currently is. By drawing attention to the representative aspect 
of jurisdictional thinking where the technologies of law are manifest in the institutional 
life of law, Dorsett and McVeigh underscore the importance of the role of the 
mouthpiece for law in its institutional form. A judge, chancellor, or parliamentarian 
might embody this notion of the office of the jurisprudent. However, the scope for 
authorship in the institutional life of law is broader than that, and includes the practices 
 
42 Supra note 1 at 16. 
 
43 Ibid at 17. 
 
 14 
of the jurist and the scholar. 
 
Traditionally, the role of the jurists has been to articulate, categorise, and comment 
upon law. Articulation of law through the mouthpiece of such an office is one of the 
ways in which law is authorised. Conversely, critical approaches to law are also 
preoccupied with that notion of authorisation and the transmission of that authority to 
declare the law. 
 
As might be expected, different systems or traditions of jurisprudence relate differently 
to jurisdiction and its different modes of authorisation. As a result, the authors state 
that “this approach is not presented as a full theory of law but rather it is an orientation 
to law that marks certain forms of conduct and commitment to lawful relations”.44 This 
orientation of thinking with law and with jurisdiction brackets discussion to the domain 
of legality. There is no attempt made to transcend or exceed law, the focus is rather 
to engage meaningfully with lawful relations. The political middle ground that is 
expounded by Pahuja is a concern that is touched upon by Dorsett and McVeigh’s 
perspective as an appeal to justice through the political, however the legal or technical 
consideration is one of the formation of lawful relations – and that is the foundation for 
the ethic of responsibility towards conduct. The jurisprudential motivations for this ethic 
is one that attempts to humanise the conduct of lawful relations. 
 
This critical approach is situated within a history of varied critical responses to law, 
many of which are centred around a horizon or measurement of justice. Accordingly, 
the authors situate their critical endeavour within a situation that acknowledges a 
language shaped by “liberty, equality, dignity and community” 45  as a modern 
configuration formulated around equality and human rights within a history of legal 
philosophical thought encompassing Dworkin, Hagel, Marx, Habermas, and Kantian 
traditions46. However, these traditions situate critique at something of a distance from 
legality. From a perspective of thinking with jurisdiction, it is important to be able to 
address the concerns of power relationships through the lens of lawful relations and 
legality. The theme that underscores the importance of humanising legal relationships 
is centred around the pragmatic consideration that jurisdiction can be approached as 
the mode by which human relationships are instituted before the law. As a result, 
“thinking with jurisdiction invites more concern with means than with ultimate ends”47. 
The authors describe the critique as less formal, focusing rather on the modes and 
manners of coming into being with the law. How we live with law, and the quality and 
texture of that belonging is what inhabits an ethic of responsibility towards jurisdiction. 
 
However, in focusing on configurations of authority and legality, a critical engagement 
 
44 Ibid at 20. 
 
45 Ibid at 21. 
 
46 See also Michael Sandel “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self”  
(Feb, 1984) 12:1 Political Philosophy 81 – 96 online: 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/191382>.  
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with jurisdiction leaves aside notions of justice and justification. A limit of this critique 
is that it doesn't seek to move towards that horizon of justice, it rather confined itself 
to quality and conduct of lawful relations as they are approached through jurisdictional 
thought and practice. Accordingly,  
 
“a jurisprudence of jurisdiction allows us to take responsibility for a 
range of practices of authority, representation, and conduct. Here we 
link an ethic of responsibility to the office of the jurisprudent and a 
concern for maintaining a connection between lawful and human 
relations”48.  
 
This ethic of responsibility inhabits the office of the jurist or jurisprudent who is the 
mouthpiece that exercises jurisdiction. Given that jurisdiction connotes authority and 
through its inauguration of jurisprudence has a form that exists aside from substantive 
issues, this ethic is located outside the content of any given dispute. However, a 
plurality of jurisdictional forms gives rise to a similar plurality of jurisdictional 
responsibility. Sticking closely to the motivating consideration of humanising legal 
relationships, the authors have taken as a horizon value the acknowledgment of the 
forms of human relationships. “We treat this in part as a question of attending to the 
texture or form of jurisdictional practice and in part a matter of orientation towards 
human relations”49 
 
The framing of lawful relations is the main theme runs through each aspect of the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group case. Because jurisdiction as a critical engagement or 
praxis encompasses the mechanisms, technologies, and metaphysics of the 
underlying framework of jurisdiction, the movement of the HTG case can be analysed 
without a pre-existing slant but from a multitude of directions. In addressing the 
threshold of law, a praxis of jurisdiction can make space for other accounts of law and 
uncover different textures of legal relationships. The Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group case 
is based on the articulation and formation of lawful relations, and as such a 
jurisdictional approach can add a dimension to the decision to move from a traditionally 
sovereign Canadian jurisdiction in the usual sense of the word, to an international one 
bounded by human rights. 
 
A Jurisdictional praxis has the potential to uncover the machinery that underwrites and 
connects the different processes that shape the relationship between the Canadian 
state and HTG. The repackaging of the legal evolution of the HTG case exposes the 
hidden mechanisms that influence the quality of the legal relationship. The texture of 
lawful relations is filtered through the jurisdictional lens of law’s inauguration, 
authorisation, and representation to reveal an uneven and inequitable landscape or 
scaffolding that frames the space in which negotiation of new legal relationships takes 
place. The jurisdictional reshuffling within the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group case makes 
it possible to tease out the ways Aboriginal governments and the Hul’qumi’num Treaty 
Group participants are tethered to the body of law. The jurisdictional approach gives 
credence to the space generated by enabling a praxis of jurisdiction to seek out 
 
48 Ibid at 27. 
 
49 Ibid at 29. 
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meeting place for laws and thereby make more room for negotiations between 




IV. Thinking with Jurisdiction 
 
Because of the varied literature on jurisdiction, the language used to describe the 
approach in its entirety is different among different authors. This notion of “thinking 
with jurisdiction” is initially drawn from the work of Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun 
McVeigh in their 2012 book entitled "Jurisdiction” – one of the texts in the series 
“critical approaches to law”. In this text, they set out to explain a different perspective 
that not only touches on the broadest questions of law, but also takes into account the 
practice of law and the formation of legal relationships, right down to the nuances of 
its technical ordering.50 This text is meant as a type of instruction manual to signpost 
this practice of thinking with jurisdiction, and the authors outline their work through a 
selection of examples and case studies that each deal with a different formulation or 
interaction through the lens of jurisdiction. Much of this is historically situated, allowing 
a perspective that is firmly rooted in legal traditions, while at the same time challenging 
the reader to re-examine some of the less apparent assumptions made by modern 
law. From this perspective, a praxis of Jurisdiction is a powerful tool to examine the 
authorisation, recognition and legitimisation of legal relations. The process of 
unpacking jurisdiction can generate creative outcomes, while still remaining within the 
legal traditions by relying on historical forms of law that are outside current 
arrangement of legal organisation. 
 
Considered in the broadest of terms, and drawing on a considerable lineage of legal 
philosophy from St. Augustine to Coke 51, the starting point for this jurisdictional 
thinking arrives by way of considering the shape of law and legal relations, and the 
ways in which law provides the underlying architecture for our everyday interactions. 
Our daily lives are delimited and shaped by our interactions with the law, and not just 
a generic or natural law, but oftentimes by the law as dictated by the precise and 
complex categorisation that attends the notion of jurisdiction.52 From the momentous 
occasions of our births, marriages and deaths – to all the parking tickets, building 
codes, and safety regulations in between – our social lives are outlined by law. At its 
most basic, jurisdiction as an organising mechanism provides for the way in which we 
do things with the law. From the perspective of the legal practitioner, jurisdiction is a 
familiar notion that is firmly rooted in the "where" and "how" of practicing law. It 
regulates when one can contest a speeding ticket, which offences can be heard within 
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grounds an appeal can be made to a higher court. Jurisdiction outlines the "where" 
and "how" of engagement with the processes and practices of law.54  At its most 
practical, it provides a method of organization for how to live with law and engage with 
lawful relations55, while at once also encompassing the point of articulation at which 
law is mapped onto our everyday lives. In this way we can see the minutiae of legal 
techniques as they percolate through to the everyday, and yet operate at the threshold 
of law and at the “limit of its competence”56. Another way of conceiving of these 
technologies are as the representations that the jurisdictional machinery has in our 
everyday lives.  
 
Dorsett and McVeigh speak about jurisdiction as the embodiment of the institutional 
life of law. In so doing, they consider varying forms of jurisdiction and create a critical 
endeavour that they describe as thinking with jurisdiction. Jurisdiction as an 
institutional process is concerned with the articulation and language of authority and 
authorisation – and the way that the varying technologies of jurisdiction are manifest 
in the architecture of lawful relations. In a top-down approach, jurisdiction is the 
process that authorises law. In many cases jurisdiction is assumed. That founding 
moment where jurisdiction in fact precedes the law is overlooked in favour of 
downstream concerns or prior questions of validation. Jurisdiction as a concept can 
be seen as a practice that gives life to the legal institution, and as such it generates 
legal meaning. It is in fact a jurisprudence. If jurisdiction generates the legal space in 
which to create and shape law, it also performs the ongoing practices that build the 
ever-growing tree of jurisprudence. 
 
The forms of jurisdictional thought outlined by Dorsett and McVeigh make visible 
aspects of legal processes. This practice of thinking with Jurisdiction through the 
formulations of inauguration, authorisation, and representation - provide a framework 
for a jurisdictional practice that can interrogate the complex web of legal relationships. 
These jurisdictional forms draw attention to the work done by the concept of jurisdiction 
as it is used in day-to-day legal practice, however the theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the notion of jurisdiction are brought to the fore in considering the 
aspects of authorisation and inauguration that go hand in hand with the jurisdictional 
technologies. Despite the philosophical considerations, an account of a practice of 
jurisdiction also considers how those forms are actioned and manifest, and in so doing 
provides an approach to thinking with jurisdiction that can allow for an alternative 
description of the ways in which persons, places, and events are brought into the 
sphere of law, or belong to law. 
 
There are a variety of forms of the way in which jurisdiction is manifest, and the 
vocabulary and explanation of jurisdiction as a practice differs widely between the 
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wide-ranging authorship. The forms of jurisdiction that are made evident is dictated 
somewhat by the content that is being evaluated and the scope in which jurisdiction is 
being applied. For the purposes of the context particular to the Hul’qumi’num Treaty 
Group, an account with numerous different facets will be most productive, and in each 
case borrowing from the different vocabularies that best explain each theme. Broadly 
speaking, jurisdictional praxis will be approached from three distinct but overlapping 
directions, namely Jurisdiction through representation, authorisation, and 
inauguration.  
 
What Dorsett and McVeigh term ‘technologies of jurisdiction’ encompasses the 
machinery that drives the jurisdictional process. These can loosely be grouped under 
the umbrella category of representation, so the mode of jurisdiction as representation 
will continue through each chapter of the work. For the purposes of this endeavour, 
the machinery for jurisdiction can be described as technologies of mapping, writing, 
precedent, and categorisation. 
 
The second approach to jurisdictional praxis emphasises the relationship between 
authority and authorisation. Themes of territorial sovereignty and the speech or 
declaration of law fall under this heading. The theme of authorisation will persist 
through work done by Berman and Peter Rush as it connects to discussions of 
sovereignty. However, this notion of authorisation strays closest to the work done by 
Pahuja, who organises the jurisdictional approach through notions of community, 
territory, and governance57. The attention paid to political community in particular ties 
concepts of authority and territory to the larger questions posed by a conceptual take 
on jurisdiction.   
 
The final organising theme refers back to the fundamental question of law’s 
inauguration, where jurisdiction acts at the threshold of lawful relationships. While this 
overlaps with notions of territorial sovereignty, Douzinas’ account of the metaphysics 
of jurisdiction probes the space in which law exists58, and asks not the characteristic 
question of ‘whose law?’, which was the purview of the theme of authorisation, but 
‘why law the first place?’. This particular manifestation of jurisdiction infers the aspect 
of the space that exists outside of the existing jurisdiction, or the liminal space between 
multiple existing jurisdictions. This law as one of encounter is configured best through 
Asha Kaushal’s critical redescription of international jurisdictions and narratives59. “We 
locate, then, jurisdiction in the languages of authority and power and in the practices of 
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V. Jurisdiction as Representation 
 
Representation as an approach to thinking with jurisdiction allows for a description of 
the processes that operates at the point at which the machinery of law makes visible 
contact with persons, places or events. How ideas are represented within the legal 
processes can be considered a mode of jurisdiction, as it is jurisdiction that decides 
on the validity of the representation offered. Before any thought is given to the pith and 
substance of the representations, the ‘how?’ of those representations and their 
inclusion as appropriate to the specific legal sphere is mediated though jurisdiction.  
 
Accordingly, notions of truth and fact occupy an interesting place in the configuration 
of lawful relationships and the threshold of law. Excluding the scholarship devoted to 
notions of truth in legal proceedings, the main focus here is the concept of 
representation as a reconfiguration of jurisdiction. If we consider that it is only truthful 
representations that may be attached to law, then the manner of that representation 
and the judgement of its accuracy becomes threshold for entry into the existing 
jurisprudence. What do I mean here by representation? In this case representation 
could be somewhat analogous to articulation, where only that which is properly 
communicated and articulated can be deemed appropriate for inclusion at the 
threshold of lawful relations. The technologies of mapping and writing fall in to this 
theme of representation. So too, do the notions of precedent and categorisation.61 
 
Any mode of communication is merely a placeholder for a concept, and as such 
interpretation of those concepts shapes the fundamental crafting and conduct of lawful 
relations. As mapping is a tool that can be used to represent and therefore attach 
notions, particularly property, to the body of law - so too is written language a 
corresponding technology of representation. Any negotiation of lawful interaction 
needs-must use some form of language to communicate. However, because of the 
specific lexicon used within the formation of lawful relations, notions attached to 
specific words and phrases carry the weight of law. That weight of law brings with it 
considerations of legal precedent, binding future decisions to the frameworks created 
through this process. 
 
Mapping, like writing, rather than acting as just an account of the law as it is, actually 
participates in the crafting of legal relations between persons, places, or events. As 
with writing, mapping acts as an approachable representation of information, and 
indeed legal information allows for not only the scope of the known, but also the 
unknown.62 For example, I do not personally know that Antarctica exists, however I 
have seen it on a map and there are written accounts that allow me to believe that it 
does exist. As a tool of representation mapping and writing are invaluable. However, 
as a jurisdictional technology they participate not just in the communication of 
information but in the generation of jurisdiction and legal space. Something that can 
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ordinates on a map, one can see this practice as creating the link between authority 
and territory via the jurisdictional technology of map making.  
 
From a more proximal perspective, consider that in examining the title to land and the 
boundaries of physical ownership, one relies on a survey as a proof of the perimeter 
of one’s jurisdiction. The physical proof of that line, in essence a map that is supposed 
to represent the truth of the boundary, becomes the origin of the truth for the 
jurisdiction over the land. As mapping is a mechanism for communicating and 
representing the truth – or one perspective on the truth – so too is it a representation 
of law and a vehicle for jurisdiction. 
 
The technology of writing occupies a similar place as a jurisdictional technology. By 
way of illustration, anyone who has arrived just as a parking enforcement officer writes 
them a ticket can likely attest to the fact that oftentimes the officer regretfully informs 
us that there is nothing they can do, as the ticket has already been written and there 
exists an enduring carbon copy of the receipt.63 From the perspective of jurisdiction, 
the ticket has already entered into the network of law and that point of contact cannot 
be undone. The ticket can’t un-write itself, but neither does this legal actor have the 
authority to destroy it - so it stands as a physical expression of the point of contact for 
an engagement with law through jurisdiction.   
 
Writing is the preferred method of legal communication and initiation in the common 
law system. As a technology of jurisdiction, writing represents not just a means of 
transmitting the account or fact of law, but as a way in which to engage with lawful 
relations and the scope of law.64 When the law is written down it interacts with, and 
has the full weight of, all the antecedent laws and precedents that are harnessed to 
the manifestation or representation of that law. The written presence brings law to 
legal life as it participates with society. Writing as a practice or technology of 
jurisdiction rather than simply a statement or representation illustrates the way in which 
we come in to law. Often that act of writing not only defines the parameters with which 
we engage in lawful relations, but also authors or initiates our contact with law. 
Focusing on writing as a technology provides a means to disengage from questions 
of what has been written and move to the fact that something has been written, with 
the attendant questions of how and why and to what effect that act of writing might 
have. 
 
These so-called technologies of jurisdiction act as the more tangible representation of 
law in our day-to-day lived existence, interacting with our everyday lives and 
participating as tools in the crafting of our lawful relations. The tools of mapping and 
writing are easily accessible, and with respect to representation, have a life outside 
the crafting of lawful relationships. The machinery of stare decisis and legal 
categorisation achieve similar results in their jurisdictional work, although they are 
somewhat more embedded in the legal landscape. 
 
Stare decisis, or the rule of precedent, is a key way in which law is expanded and 
interpreted to add to the existing machinery of common law. The fact that like cases 
 




must be treated alike creates a continuous link from past to present. The entire body 
of case law represents individual instances where persons, places, and events are 
tested against existing legal frameworks, and often attached and perpetuated as a link 
in a chain of similar decisions. Cases before the Supreme Court where matters of law 
rather than fact are in question represent cornerstones of jurisprudence that advance 
the threshold of how a concept or situation does or does not fit within the existing 
scaffolding of legal knowledge. The ability of the jurisdictional technologies to infiltrate 
or influence our lives is clearly seen even in the most innocuous of legal interactions. 
The regulations that shape our built and lived environment and the laws that configure 
all of our acceptable social relationships are organised by an overarching structure 
that is managed by jurisdiction. 
 
That existing jurisdictional management or categorisation is the way in which 
jurisdiction is most often perceived. This technology of categorisation means that 
persons, places, and events have a predetermined location and are sorted 
accordingly, and the sorting dictates outcomes of the legal relationships. Marianna 
Valverde offers an excellent example in her characterisation of meta-governance65 in 
the case of the Eskimo (Inuit) of Northern Canada. Jurisdiction as a ‘governing 
mechanism for governance’ shapes the landscape of interaction where questions of 
jurisdiction, rather than content, determine the outcome the case. She offers up a 
Canadian example were a question was posed to the Supreme Court. The question 
asked if, for the purposes of the Indian act,66 the Inuit or Eskimos as they were known, 
were Indians. If they were Indians then the federal government had jurisdiction and 
responsibility over the Inuit, and they would be subject to the Indian act. The Canadian 
Supreme Court did indeed agree that the Inuit were Indians and that process of 
categorisation set in motion predetermined routes through law. By deciding how and 
where a case is heard, jurisdiction acts as a gatekeeper for all aspects of lawful 
relations. While much of the initial scholarship on jurisdiction focuses on the conflict of 
law as a concept of jurisdiction, in terms of who has the authority to hear a certain 
dispute, this practice of categorisation pre-sorts how the cases even presented prior 
to the typical jurisdictional decisions. 
 
Within the nation-state, the meta-governance or technology of categorisation arranges 
all of the legal assemblages into their proper places. This categorising process does 
not leave any space for that which exists outside of law. There is, in a sense, a space 
for everything – or space in which everything can be decided. However This legal 
ordering has the capacity to change the outcomes of lawful relations. There are 
overlapping jurisdictions even within and organised nation-state, and the choice of 
which jurisdiction or how to change a jurisdiction can have a considerable impact on 
the forum that any legal remedy or lawful relation can take. In Dorsett and McVeigh’s 
work on jurisdiction, this process of categorisation naturally leads to the legal actors 
who make those kinds of decisions and the roles they play in the implementation of 
jurisdiction as a praxis. This extends beyond the current discussion of technologies of 
jurisdiction and moves towards the notion of authority and authorisation as a 
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jurisdictional form. However, it is worth mentioning that these technologies are 
necessarily implemented by legal actors who play their own role in the machinery of 
jurisdiction and it is in them that the ethic of responsibility is vested.67 
 
Under the theme of ‘jurisdiction through representation’, we have seen the ways in 
which the technologies of jurisdiction provide the machinery for persons, places and 
events to enter into law. In this case jurisdiction as representation brings to light the 
distinguishing techniques that shape the every-day interactions and landscapes of 
lawful relations. The tools of mapping, writing, precedent, and categorisation, are all 
representations of the work done by jurisdiction. The crafting of lawful relations is done 
by legal actors for the most part, however the tools and processes that underwrite the 
various ways of being with the law are evident in the jurisdictional technologies. These 
technologies have the capacity to mediate what, and how, and who, is attached to law. 
Jurisdiction mediates contact point at which law touches the lives of individuals and 
the places they inhabit. 
 
VI. Jurisdiction as Authorisation 
 
A praxis of jurisdiction can be understood through representation, authorisation, and 
inauguration. However, to split jurisdictional thinking in this way is to obscure the fact 
that these separations are not a necessity, merely a convenient way to organise and 
introduce the subject. Jurisdictional thinking encapsulates the smallest technologies 
or assemblages of legal machinery as well as the largest questions of law's 
inauguration. Overlapping between the two are the notions of authority and 
authorisation, which naturally touch on aspects of both. Just as representation through 
mapping, writing, precedent, and categorisation had ramifications for authority and 
territorial sovereignty, so too does the lens of authorisation touch on the technologies 
of jurisdiction and law’s inauguration. Breaking jurisdiction and these three facets 
cedes some ground to jurisdiction as political community as is argued by Kaushal. She 
organises approaches to jurisdictional thinking through territory, community, and 
governance – making room for a jurisdictional account of political community 
embedded within the whole.68 One cannot discuss the threshold of law without also 
speaking about the community that has formed the law, moving towards a broader 
sense of community mentioned by Berman.69 
 
Connotations of authority reside in the origin of the word jurisdiction, from the Latin ius 
dicere – to speak the law.70 Aside from the craft of law, jurisdiction is often the 
battleground for the conflict of laws71. In such a dispute, the question often doesn’t 
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directly concern the content of a case, but typically addresses where the case should 
be heard, or more particularly, who has the authority to make a decision.  
  
For example, the division of powers in Canada is outlined in sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 186772, which splits the authority to create law between the federal 
and provincial governments, with any residual powers resting with the federal 
government (one of the key ways in which Canadian legal architecture differs from the 
United States 73 ).  Section 91(26) delegates exclusive legislative authority over 
marriages and divorce to the federal government. However, Section 92 (12) gives the 
provincial legislatures the authority to enact laws regarding the solemnisation of 
marriages.  
 
At the point when same-sex marriage was being widely debated in Canada, the 
province of Alberta passed Bill 202 to amend the provincial Marriages Act in an attempt 
to block same-sex marriage by defining marriage as exclusively between members of 
the opposite sex. However, based on a Supreme Court Reference case regarding 
prospective federal legislation on same-sex marriage74, the provincial Marriages Act 
was arguably actually ultra vires or “beyond the powers” of the provincial government, 
as the province had exceeded its jurisdiction by passing a law on the definition rather 
than the solemnisation of marriage.  
 
What can be taken from this example is that the jurisdiction to pronounce the law is 
the avenue through which the legal argument was framed. From this, one can also 
clearly see that "jurisdiction connotes authority"75, and the locus of that authority is one 
of the key aspects of jurisdictional thinking that makes it relevant to the praxis of 
jurisdiction. The early literature in jurisdictional theory draws on the work of Peter 
Rush, and considers as a starting point in jurisdictional thinking the following:  
 
Jurisdiction is not so much a discourse, not so much a statement of the 
law, but a site or space of enunciation. Jurisdiction refers us first and 
foremost to the power and authority to speak in the name of the law and 
only subsequently to the fact that law is stated – and stated to be 
someone or something”76. 
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 Authority and authorisation play a key role in jurisdictional thinking, as questioning the 
appropriateness of belonging to law is not an endeavour that is necessarily familiar 
within the contemporary context of authority via sovereignty. We have a tendency to 
think almost exclusively in terms of territorial jurisdictions when considering modern 
law 77 . In thinking about domestic law it is tempting to conceive of questions of 
jurisdiction within the nation-state framework, where in the end all questions rest with 
the final federal authority and oftentimes jurisdiction is assumed. 
 
Moving from authority to authorisation however, locates the emphasis on queries of 
legitimisation.  The authority to speak in the name of the law is firmly associated with 
jurisdiction. This authority remains unquestioned, unless jurisdiction can do the work 
of interrogating the mechanism by which law is authorised. The structure that 
authorises and decides on the downstream jurisdictional categorisation is inescapably 
linked to questions of sovereignty. The project of a practice of jurisdiction is to question 
the entrance and exit to and from law's domain. Authorisation as a mode of jurisdiction 
encourages the scrutiny of the authorising apparatus responsible the downstream 
jurisdictional scaffolding. It's very easy for the perspectives on authority and 
authorisation to collapse in to the framing of inauguration as they share many points 
in common. However, where our practice of jurisdiction interrogates the lineage of 
authority and authorisation through jurisdiction, inauguration focuses on the point of 




 VII. Jurisdiction as Inauguration 
 
Inauguration as a mode of jurisdiction takes a more metaphysical approach to the 
method of jurisdictional critique. This is where jurisdictional thinking moves from 
querying the “how” of law’s shaping and organisation, to the question of law’s initial 
existence, and whose law it is to begin with. This notion of addressing law at the limit 
of its competence78 allows jurisdiction to examine the very edges of legal relations. By 
examining the law's perimeter, a praxis of jurisdiction can look beyond the internal 
generating structures to the space outside law’s domain.  
 
A question of jurisdiction can be considered "the first question of law",79 because 
unlike other lines of inquiry, it asks first not what the law is, but rather if law exists at 
all. Only after considering if something might properly belong to law is there then space 
for there to be a declaration of what the law is. So, in slowing down this process to that 
initial query about whether law exists, the debate can move beyond the conflict of laws 
within the system to the choice of jurisdictions and consequently the choice of laws. If 
there is to be engagement with the law, it is important to ask if something can 
appropriately be classified as belonging to that law, and furthermore, to whose law 
would one be belonging? This is one of the fundamental questions that this framing of 
Jurisdiction provokes. 
 
77 Supra note 23. 
 
78 Supra note 33 [Kaushal] at 782. 
 
79 Supra note 1 [Jurisdiction] at 5 
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The advantage to this perspective on jurisdiction is that it can ask the larger questions 
of ‘does law exist?’, and if so – ‘whose law is it?’. In doing so it makes room for an 
acknowledgement of that which sits outside the existing jurisdiction, thereby making 
room for a meeting place of laws. It does not assume a priori law’s jurisdiction over 
the landscape of relations. 
 
When examining those larger notions of laws existence and how it arrived, there is 
some dispute regarding which came first, sovereignty or jurisdiction. From one 
perspective, sovereignty arrived first, and jurisdiction is therefore inescapably tethered 
that authority. Conversely, other authors argue that it is jurisdiction that inaugurates 
itself and it is only after jurisdiction that sovereignty follows. Formulations of 
sovereignty, and therefore community, naturally enliven this debate. The “how” of 
giving oneself the law from the perspective of the community is addressed – 
particularly pertinent is Douzinas’ discussion of bare sovereignty. Because of this 
chicken and egg debate, sovereignty sits uneasily between authority and inauguration, 
adding context to both jurisdictional facets depending on the situation that is being 
considered and its particular relationship to legitimization through sovereign power. 
However, as Kaushal points out, various authors argue that an investigation in to 
jurisdiction effectively sidesteps80 sovereignty by projecting the source as technical 
rather than political. As Bradin Cormack argues, the jurisdictional threshold is the point 
at which law speaks to itself.81 
 
Regardless of how jurisdiction is extended into new space, one key aspect of 
inauguration is that it does not have to be harnessed directly to authority vested in 
land, regardless of the questions of the “how” of sovereignty and issues of political 
community. Jurisdiction need not map exactly onto territory, although it has often been 
designed in that manner. To illustrate the capacity for jurisdiction to inaugurate law 
and its scope beyond the sphere of the Westphalian state, it is useful to hark back to 
some of the historic examples used by Dorsett and McVeigh.  
 
Consider the “Popes of the medieval Catholic Church”82. The authority of the Pope 
was considered to extend to the whole world, whereby the Holy Roman Emperor had 
a universal jurisdiction over all peoples and lands based in part on divine authority and 
in part as a matter of imperium and dominion. 
 
By the Papal Bull Romanus Pontifex, 8 January 1455… Alexander 
V1 granted the Monarch and heirs of Castille and Leon (now 
modern Spain) the exclusive right to acquire territory….limited 
only by existing claims by Christian princes.83  
 
 








This jurisdiction is not one based on the authority as vested in a territorial government, 
although it does obviously touch on issues of power and the acquisition of property. 
The salient point is that jurisdiction is not contiguous with a specific geographical 
location. This law existed and occupied a jurisdiction through a community of thought 
and ideas. Inauguration as a way of considering jurisdictional thinking allows for the 
possibility beyond the reach of current jurisdictions, implicating the notion of other 
jurisdiction and thereby acknowledging space for lawful relations. It has the capacity 
to ask; does law exist? And if so – how does it work and who authored it? 
 
From the perspective put forward in this chapter it is clear that jurisdiction is a practice, 
and is meant to be engaged with as such. Each aspect describes the ways in which 
persons places and events can be attached or tethered to the body of law. The 
advantage of a critical practice of jurisdiction is that it inhabits the existing structure of 
lawful relations while at once addressing the philosophical nature of the threshold for 
law and the limits of it. Percolating through to our everyday lives are the technologies 
of jurisdictional organisation that shape our interactions with the legal dimension and 
influence the texture of lawful relations. This jurisdictional machinery provides for the 
‘how’ of everyday minutia as it enters the body of law. The authority to speak in the 
name of the law allows a jurisdictional account of how law is authorised and 
propagated, while notions of inauguration address the perimeter of law’s influence and 
the possibilities of the spaces outside or between existing jurisdictions in which new 
relationships could be formed.  
 
Jurisdiction as a critical engagement or praxis navigates the threshold of law and can 
be used as a means of unpicking or unravelling the image of law as a coherent and 
impartial machine. Focusing on how meaning is attached to our legal architecture and 
how the building blocks of our legal lives are authorized, inaugurated, and expressed 
as a practice or activity allows one to ask different questions of the law - and examine 























CHAPTER 2. THE CANADIAN LAND CLAIMS PROCESS 
 
 
I. Jurisdiction and the British Columbia Treaty Commission 
 
The Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group has a long history of attempting to access a legal 
solution for land claims dating back to the 1800s84. This colonial history naturally 
informs the experience of the HTG. Despite long-standing barriers to lawful 
negotiations, it is the recent destruction of the natural landscape that prompts the most 
recent actions. A practice of thinking with jurisdiction allows for an alternative 
description and narrative of the HTG's journey through the contemporary land claims 
mechanisms available in British Columbia. This re-description85 makes plain the ways 
in which a practice of jurisdiction mediates the quality of lawful relations. The 
technologies and modes of jurisdiction are evident in the British Columbia treaty 
process, and as such shape the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group’s way of making contact 
with Canadian law. 
 
 
Chapter 2 describes the British Columbia treaty commission and its attendant 
processes, and proceeds to elaborate upon the relationship between Canada and the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group with respect to the negotiations at the treaty making table. 
The visible representations of jurisdiction are largely absent from such an informal 
process. However, because of its capacity to generate lawful relations, the treaty 
negotiation process is a jurisdictional configuration and is influenced by other 
technologies of jurisdiction as well as its questions of authority and inauguration. by 
paying attention to the different forms of jurisdiction it is evident that a narrative 
respecting Hul’qumi’num lands and knowledge is absent from the British Columbia 
Treaty commission process. 
 
Further to this, the symbolic violence of the language of treaty negotiations precludes 
the ways and means of thinking about indigenous law and governance. To this extent, 
the Crown has used its authority to shape negotiations and the space in which they 
are held in order to silence First Nations peoples and design the landscape upon which 
negotiations can occur. Chapter 2 argues that the non-aboriginal governments have 
intentionally designed such a space through the auspices and assumptions of 
jurisdiction so as to make it impossible to approach negotiations from a premise that 
respects Indigenous lands and Laws as a truth of treaty building. 
 
When considering the quality of the relationship between Canada and the HTG, it is 
clear that the human relations underwriting the legal relationships are damaged by the 
way is in which the Crown and the provincial government have authorised and created 
the avenues of redress when it comes to land claims endeavours. With respect to an 
ethic of responsibility, it seems that the non-aboriginal governments have abdicated 
their duty to take seriously the jurisdictional configurations of the offices of the 
jurisprudent that transmit the authority to speak in the name of law. However, before 
 
84 Supra note 12 [Case Merits Observations, 2010] 
 
85 Supra note 35 [Pahuja] 
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considering the jurisdictional aspect of the narrative, it is necessary to put the 
endeavours of treaty building in context. 
 
Unlike parts of Eastern Canada, the lands in British Columbia were not clearly 
transferred to the crown through historic treaties, and as such, there exists much 
debate about the ownership of traditional lands in the densely forested province. In 
the 1850s and 60s, the government invited colonists to purchase lands in the 
Hul'qumi'num territory through a system of pre-emption. There is no evidence the 
Hul’qumi’num were ever consulted or compensated for this, and indeed, every 
evidence that they objected to it. The conflict escalated and resulted in the “death of 
colonists, cannon fire from naval gunboats, and the destruction of the Hul’qumi’num 
village of Lamalchi”86. The governor promised to purchase the rights to the land but 
payment was never made. 
 
In 1871 the United Colony of British Columbia joined Canada, and through Article XIII 
of the Terms of Union, transferred the responsibility of the Indigenous Peoples of 
British Columbia to the federal government. The particulars of the agreement 
stipulated the building of a railroad to connect B.C. to the rest of Canada, and to that 
end the newly minted province donated a two-million-acre tract of land to the State for 
the provision of the railway. In order to pay the company that built the railroad, the 
Canadian government allowed the Esquimalt and Nanaimo (E&N) Railway Company 
to sell off some 700 000 acres of the land 87. In doing so the state transferred over 
eighty-five percent of the traditional Hul’qumi’num lands to private entities without 
consulting the Hul'qumi'num people and without obtaining the surrender of the 
Hul’qumi’num interests in those lands.88 
 
The Hul’qumi’num Peoples can evidence a persistent struggle to oppose the unilateral 
actions of the state. In 1909 the Cowichan First Nation of the Hul’qumi’num peoples 
sent a petition to King Edward of Great Britain to request that he protect the rights of 
the Hul’qumi’num in their traditional lands, which had never been purchased or ceded 
to the government. The British government referred the petition back to the 
government of Canada, who failed to take any positive action 89 . The provincial 
government of British Columbia persisted in its denial of aboriginal rights and 
maintained a policy that any such rights had been extinguished, regardless of lack of 
any judicial or statutory proof that would substantiate such a position. Later, in 1927, 
the federal government amended the Indian Act so as to prohibit Indigenous peoples 
from hiring lawyers to bring any actions against the state without the express 
permission of the Government of Canada. This law was not changed until 1951, and 
further to this, the provincial government of British Columbia barred the Hul'qumi'num 
 
86 Robert Morales “New Treaty, Same Old Problems” Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine  
30:1 (March, 2006) Online:<https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural- 
survival-quarterly/new-treaty-same-old-problems>. 
 
87 Supra note 12 [Case Merits Observations, 2010] at para 16. 
 
88 Supra note 68. 
 
89 Supra note 12 [Case Merits Observations, 2010] at para 34. 
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Peoples from seeking a judicial remedy by persisting in maintaining the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity until 1974.90 
 
In the 1990’s, the possibility of existing Aboriginal Title in the face of prospective 
resource development made the legal fate of land in B.C. uncertain. This economically 
driven uncertainty, together with political pressures favouring resolution, prompted the 
formation of the B.C. Claims Task Force in 1991, a body that included First Nations 
representatives alongside the federal and provincial representatives in the hopes that 
increased First Nations involvement would generate a more consensus-driven 
procedure and represent a marked departure from previous land claims endeavours91. 
The Task Force put together guidelines for the negotiations for modern-day treaties 
that included a document of 19 principles that should be adhered to during the 
negotiations. Following the British Columbia Claims Task Force Report92 (the Task 
Force Report), the six-step treaty negotiation procedure was implemented in 1992 
alongside the establishment of the British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) as an 
independent “keeper of the process” 93 . However, the BCTC does not have any 
adjudicatory power to keep participants in line with the recommended principles, 
merely relying on the pressures of "moral suasion" to persuade the participants to 
keep to the intent behind the negotiations.  
 
At its outset, the aim of the British Columbia Treaty Process was to provide a fair, 
creative, and non-adjudicative approach to solving the land claims issues and 
underlying disagreements between the Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal governments94. 
As can be seen from the original text of the Task Force Report, the new treaty 
negotiations in British Columbia did include the acknowledgment of the distinct 
political, cultural, and legal status of the First Nations. 
It is a conflict that speaks to the difficulties in reconciling fundamentally 
different philosophical and cultural systems… Recognition and respect 
for First Nations as self-determining and distinct nations with their own 
spiritual values, histories, languages, territories, political institutions 
and ways of life must be the hallmark of this new relationship95.  
 
90 Ibid at para 35.  
 
91 See generally Andrew Woolford, “Negotiating Affirmative Repair: Symbolic Violence in 
 the British Columbia Treaty Process”(Winter, 2004) 29 The Canadian Journal of  
Sociology. [Woolford Symbolic Violence]. 
 
92 Canada, The Report of the British Columbia Claims Task Force (June 28 1991)  
Online:<http://www.bctreaty.ca/sites/default/files/BC_Claims_Task_Force_Report_1 






95 Supra note 83 [BC Task Force Report]. 
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Aside from the existing federal land reserve trust system that exists as part of the 
widely criticized Indian Act96, the B.C. Treaty Process was to provide an alternative to 
expensive adjudication in the court system. However, if they are willing to pursue court 
proceedings, Indigenous communities can argue for Aboriginal Title to the land based 
on original occupation and the argument that the original Aboriginal Title hasn’t been 
extinguished.  Alongside the options of Aboriginal Title 97 , the protections in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms98, and the Royal Proclamation of 176399 
afford some measure of protection at the constitutional level for the creation of 
modern-day treaties.  
 
The dominant narrative of Non-Aboriginal actors in the BCTC process is framed 
through notions of practicality and reasonableness100. The British Columbia treaty 
commission widely touts its impartiality as a platform through which the parties can 
negotiate. It can point to successful treaties that have been negotiated, and the words 
of indigenous peoples as they express hope for the future relationships with 
Canada101. The federal and provincial governments fund the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission, taking ownership of the alternative dispute resolution remedies that 
facilitate the treaty negotiations. Canada can demonstrate two ways by which the 
indigenous communities of British Columbia can properly and legally make a claim to 
territory.  
 
However, since its inception over two decades ago, there has been a significant 
amount of stagnation in the progress towards equitable treaties overseen by the 
BCTC. There are a number of long-standing problems with the process, and the 
outcomes have been less than transformative in the twenty years that the parties have 
been working towards compromise. Former chief federal negotiator Robin Dodson 
admitted that the BC Treaty Commission needs to play a wider role in facilitation as a 
so-called neutral party. However, in order to play a truly independent role as the 
keeper of this process, the treaty commission needs to be truly independent of the 
three parties to the negotiations. 102  Because most of the funding for indigenous 
communities comes by way of government loans, there is a worry that some First 
Nations have already borrowed more than they can hope to see in any kind of financial 
settlement agreed by the treaty process. Furthermore, federal representatives have 
noted that it is actually cheaper for the crown to continue to negotiate, than to settle.103 
 
96 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5. 
 
97 Supra note 9 [Delgamuukw Aboriginal Title Decision] 
 
98 Supra note 16 [CCRF]. 
 
99 Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C. 1985, App. II No. 1.  
 
100 Supra note 91 [Woolford Symbolic Violence]. 
 
101 Supra note 3 [IACHR Hearing 2009] 
102 Tony Penikett. Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty Making in British Columbia  
(Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Douglas & Macintyre ltd, 2006) 267 
[Penikett]. 
 
103 Ibid. [Penikett] at 171. 
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An account of a praxis of jurisdiction as a mechanism of engagement has the capacity 
to scrutinize the construction of legal relations from inside the legal framework in order 
to evaluate the ways in which the architecture could have the capacity to interact with 
the legal landscape in which it is inescapably situated. This mechanism of “thinking 
with jurisdiction”104 is particularly useful when considering that the starting point for the 
investigation into the Hul’qumi’num case arises first in a domestic commission, and 
only latterly moves to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at the failure 
of the first legal forum. Despite not attempting an Aboriginal Title challenge in the 
British Columbia courts, the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG) did engage in a limited 
negotiation with the provincial government via the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission (BCTC)105.  
 
The British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) and its attendant treaty process 
have generated considerable criticism from both academic and government bodies106. 
The observations on the procedures, content, and affect of the negotiations arrive via 
varying fields of economics, politics, political geography 107 , sociology 108 , native 
studies109- many of which take an avowedly political stance. In reviewing some of the 
literature that addresses the BCTC process from the social context for legal relations, 
it is evident that these critiques often focus on narratives reflecting politics, power 
dynamics, and context rather than the conduct of legal mechanisms and legality.  
 
 In contrast, the only ethic of Jurisdiction is one of taking responsibility for the conduct 
of lawful relations through the office of the jurisprudent110.  Using this approach allows 
for the consideration of the ways in which persons, places, and events come into 
contact with the law, and the mechanisms or technologies by which they might be 
enfolded into law. An evaluative use of Jurisdiction allows for an examination of the 
juncture at which law engages with social life, and how these persons places and 
events are brought into the realm of law – or not, as the case may be. It also allows 
 
 
104 Supra note 1 [Jurisdiction]. 
  
105 Supra note 92 [BC Task Force Report]. 
  
106 See generally Andrew Woolford, “Negotiating Affirmative Repair: Symbolic Violence in 
 the British Columbia Treaty Process”(Winter, 2004) 29 The Canadian Journal of  
Sociology; Alfred Taiaiake, “ Deconstructing the British Columbia Treaty Process [  
Paper in: Indigenous Peoples and the International Sphere” (2001) 3 Balayi: Culture,  
Law, and Colonialism. 39. 
 
107 Nicholas Blomley, “The Ties That Blind: Making Fee Simple in the British Columbia  
Treaty Process”(April 2015) 40:2 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers  
168 – 79. [Blomley BCTP]. 
 




110 Supra note 50 at 23.  
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for that ethic of responsibility to evaluate the texture and quality of the relationships, 
not just their existence or otherwise. The BCTC process is organised around a 
negotiation process, and with the informality of this process the jurisdictional 
techniques that shape it become more difficult to distinguish. The most accessible 
technologies start with writing and categorisation, moving through to the more formal 




II. Writing as a Technology of Jurisdiction in the BCTC Process. 
 
Much of what is actually said in the treaty making process is not readily accessible: 
the negotiations are confidential and actual text is not available for public consumption. 
The most direct of the literature that critiques the BCTC process comes from interviews 
with the participants in both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal governments. While it is 
not possible to access the language used at the specific negotiation table, it is possible 
to draw conclusions from what the varying actors have said about the process. This is 
necessarily non-specific to the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, however the experience 
of the HTG and the British Columbia Treaty Commission's abject failure to negotiate 
an equitable compromise echoes the experience of the majority of First Nations 
communities. Text available through the audio recordings of the hearings111 and case 
arguments made before Inter-American Commission on Human Rights112 as well as 
comments by chief Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group’s chief negotiator Robert Morales113 
support the current criticisms levelled at the BCTC process. 
 
The jurisdictional technology of writing in this instance has to be extrapolated to the 
ways in which the language used in the context of negations influences the narratives 
available to First Nations communities. Beyond the difficulties in analysing an informal 
process that is secretive and unavailable to external critique, there are certainly 
questions of legitimacy and authority that overlap into considerations of a lack of 
oversight that properly mediates the discourse. However, despite a lack of formalised 
doctrine or text, the possibility of a meeting place for laws and the quality of the lawful 
 
111 IACHR Hearing and Other Public Events “Session: 133 Period of Session; Date:  
 Tuesday, October 28, 2008. Precautionary Measures and Petition 592.07 –  
 Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, Canada” online: cidh  
 <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Audiencias/133/B26HulquminumTreatyGroupCana 
da.mp3>; IACHR Hearing and Other Public Events “Session: 134 Period of Session; 
Date: Monday, March 23, 2009. Petition 592.07 and Precautionary Measures 110/07  




112 IACHR Hearing and Other Public Events “Session: 143 Period of Session; Date:  
Friday, October 28, 2011. Case 12.734 – Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group,  
Canada” online: cidh <http://www.cidh.org/audiencias/143/36.mp3>. 
 
113 Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, “Robert Morales: Seeking Justice Elsewhere”  




relationship is none-the-less evident through the casual use of language perpetuated 
by the actors and crafters that are party to the formal negotiations. The language used 
by the representatives of the process both shapes the way in which the relationships 
are considered, and reflects the ways in which the provincial and federal governments 
conceive of their relationship with aboriginal governments.  
 
This is where the technology of writing merges to a certain extent with the spoken 
word, meaning that the text of the shaping of the relationship is influenced by oral 
arguments prior to being codified. What has to be inferred here is the nature and 
texture of the engagement with the mechanism of coming in to and being with law that 
is the hallmark of a jurisprudence of jurisdiction. These negotiations have the capacity 
to inaugurate law, and as such fall under such a jurisdictional purview. None-the-less, 
without access to written minutes of negotiations, the challenge in this case is an uphill 
battle to prove a negative. Arguably, a language that reflects and treats with the laws 
and property notions of First Nations peoples within the British Columbia Treaty 
Process is absent. An obvious example is that many First Nations languages do not 
have either a word or a corresponding concept for land ownership, the closest one 
being “the place of my ancestors”114. There is no evidence that a common vocabulary 
was ever introduced into discussions, and every evidence that colonial norms and 
structures dominate the language of negotiations. This absent narrative forecloses on 
notions of indigenous nation-building and land tenure by perpetuating the language of 
the overriding colonial jurisdiction of Canada.  
 
The vocabulary that is used by non-aboriginal governments is indicative of how those 
governments shape the available entrances and exits to Canadian law. While the B.C. 
Claims Task Force exhibits acceptable ideals and language, the actual negotiations 
seem to be conducted in a different manner. Consider by way of introduction the 
reference in this document to aboriginal and non-aboriginal governments as the 
means of organising or categorising notions of different types of government. This 
architecture is actually borrowed from Alfred Taiaiake115, where the articulation of 
these contrasting jurisdictions gives equal weight to the governments while using 
Indigenous governments as the term of reference. This set up could in fact arguably 
illustrate an occasion where the author has inadvertently employed a praxis of 
jurisdiction to mediate the language surrounding the categorisation of legal order. This 
type of reconfiguring of language seems wholly absent from accounts of the BCTC 
process, and clearly illustrates the insidious ways in which the language of the 
authorising mechanism influences the ways in which negotiations are conducted. In 
kind, while the “First Nations” term of address is built-in to Canadian law, the 
recognition it is given is exemplified by reference to the government when speaking 
about government bodies and their authority. The recognition of the status of 
aboriginal governments is absent from the written documents available and reflects 
 
114Leroy Little Bear, "Aboriginal Relationships to the Land and Resources." Sacred Lands.  
Ed. Jill Oaks, et al. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba: Department of Native Studies,  
1998. 15-21. 
 
115 Alfred Taiaiake, “ Deconstructing the British Columbia Treaty Process [ Paper in:  




the ways in which provincial and federal governments see their relationship with 
indigenous peoples. Other states and bodies internationally recognise this idea that 
indigenous communities have their own law116, however this is even absent from the 
idealistic BC claims task force117 and the dialogue between the British Columbia 
Government and indigenous peoples is phrased without any reference to indigenous 
law, meaning that negotiations do not represent a meeting place of laws and 
jurisdictions, rather consisting of an overarching jurisdiction with no place for voicing 
other laws. 
 
Despite the fact that written records for many of the negotiations are absent, it is 
possible to see the link between the language used in negotiations, and the 
prospective written product of the treaty. The part of this that is perhaps obscured, is 
the fact that language shapes how persons think about laws and relationships, the 
result being that the use of language influences the conduct of lawful relations and 
precludes a certain kind of thought about the legal relations between ‘the government 
and her Native Indians’. 
 
Criticism has been levelled at the BCTC process by Woolford, who picks up on this 
specific notion that what is said influences how one is able to think about the process. 
He frames this through narrative of symbolic violence, which situates the critique 
outside law's domain, pointing to the impact negotiations have on indigenous 
communities. What jurisdiction can add to this point is that to the extent that language 
and what is written down in the form of formal treaties shapes the jurisprudence of 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal relations, the choice of this language is the purview of 
the provincial or federal governments. It reflects their bias and perpetuates a particular 
way of being with law. From the perspective of jurisdiction, this language acts as a 
gatekeeper for the engagement with and entrance into productive legal relationships. 
  
There are a few salient points made by Woolford in particular that are relevant to the 
emerging technologies of jurisdiction in the BCTC process.  Of note is the observation 
that despite equality of process and the use of the Task Force themes of equality and 
honesty, there still exist a considerable number of discernible issues in the actual 
practice of negotiations.  The first part of Woolford's account argues that the core 
principles of the BCTC that stipulate the aims of justice and certainty118 as part of the 
proceedings are fundamentally contradictory. The aims of certainty pertain to the 
desire for a knowable settlement that persists for the foreseeable future. The interests 
of the provincial government, Non-Aboriginal communities, and corporate land 
development, are all evident in the idea that financial security will stabilise the 
development of the province. 
 
This desire for certainty, particularly financial certainty, is often at odds with the 
Aboriginal government's desire for justice. In this case, justice contains the idea of 
recognition of past wrongs, and at least in part, the public acknowledgment of past 
 
116 See eg. Mabo v Queensland, [1992] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, (1992) 107 A. L. R. 1 (H. Ct. Aust.). 
 
117 Supra note 92 [BC Task Force Report]. 
 
118 Supra note 91 [Woolford Symbolic Violence]. 
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wrongdoing and appropriate compensation. This justice narrative is seen to undermine 
the idea of certainty, to which Non-Aboriginal governments are resistant119. This use 
of language and use of the text of the B.C. Claims Task Force frames the way in which 
the issues are thought about.  This is the foundation for what Woolford refers to as 
“symbolic violence”. The principles of honesty and openness in negotiations are used 
in a way that allows the Non-Aboriginal Governments to specify at the outset the 
parameters the HTG are allowed to negotiate. “By attaching their actions to the valued 
normative criterion of honesty, the symbolic objective of this statement is to disguise 
the instrumental, positional basis of the non-Aboriginal government's negotiation 
policy”120. By declaring the facts of the possibilities of the negotiations, they enclose 
what is possible as existing within the prior conceptions of Canadian law. The notions 
of the rational person and “being realistic” are used as a mechanism for arguing that 
redress for past injustices and the transfer of large tracts of land in British Columbia 
are outside the purview of the process.  
 
The goal of symbolic violence, then, is to persuade the "other" to 
embrace the interests of the dominant group(s) by constructing the 
parameters for rational action in a way that makes it difficult to discuss, 
or even to "think," matters outside of these limited parameters121 
 
 
As noted in the first chapter, one of the strengths in the jurisdictional critique or the 
redescription of legal processes is that it can be used as a productive measure to 
interrogate the quality of lawful relations and in so doing uncover potential solutions. 
In the case of using terminology such as aboriginal law and aboriginal governments in 
the common parlance of negotiations, this should be an easy fix. However, as McVeigh 
notes in Postmodern Jurisprudence, this assumed that the project of post-modernism 
is still alive and well, in that as long as an adequate mechanism of communication are 
established, the solutions to conflict will be forthcoming122. Engagement with the 
technologies of jurisdiction that are evident in language and writing would require non-
aboriginal governments to take seriously the quality of the conduct of lawful relations. 
However, Non-aboriginal governments have a vested interest in maintaining the status 
quo through the use of language. Tony Penikett observes that with a measure of 
independence from provincial and federal funding, the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission could open and support negotiations around issues such as co-
jurisdiction, but “Peace-making requires a different mind-set than the normal 





120 Ibid at 121. 
 
121 Ibid at 118. 
 
122 Douzinas, Costas; Ronnie Warrington & Shaun McVeigh. Postmodern Jurisprudence:  
The Law of the Text in the Texts of Law (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1993).  
[Postmodern Jurisprudence]. 
 
123 Supra note 102, [Penikett] at 270. 
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The technology of writing, making permanent a statement about law and the crafting 
of lawful relations, can be extended to the use of specific language in the negotiation 
stage of the British Columbia Treaty Commission Process. Seen from the perspective 
of jurisdiction, the act of negotiation happens at the threshold of law, and very much 
represents the praxis of jurisdiction. To that end, the language used in the negotiation 
is crucial to the shaping of the way in which the Hul’qumi’num people interact with 
Canadian law for future generations. With the speech of legal relations filtered through 
the language of Canadian jurisprudence, the underwriting architecture overwhelmingly 
excludes notions outside of its own understanding, thereby excluding notions of 
Hul’qumi’num law. As Glen Coulthard argues from a similar perspective on power and 
politics, “colonial relations of power are no longer reproduced primarily through overtly 
coercive means, but rather through the asymmetrical exchange of mediated forms of 
state recognition and accommodation” 124 . The language used in the negotiation 
process can be re-examined through a praxis of jurisdiction to uncover the ways in 
which the speech of law functions as jurisdictional tool that regulates the Hul’qumi’num 
entrance into Canadian law, and in performing that role it re-affirms existing 




III. The Role of Precedent Within Treaty Negotiations  
 
Despite the informal relationships of negotiations, notions of jurisdiction through 
precedent still shape the arrangement and conduct of lawful relations. As a technology 
legal precedent is a very powerful tool, particularly in its functions as a link in the chain 
of like decisions with potential ramifications beyond existing interactions. For the 
parties to the BCTC Process, the salient aspect of this technology lies in the use of 
language and the way it is connected to prior decisions. Non-aboriginal governments 
are wary of the prospect that using specific language will tether them to future 
decisions and liabilities. Government actors prioritise the monetary requirement of the 
treaty negotiations, and the use of language within negotiations is carefully calculated 
to exclude the necessity of redress. With regards to internal discussion on treaty 
negotiation by the non-aboriginal government, “the operative test is not – as observed 
by the Auditor General and many others – what must we do in order to make progress 
against objectives; it is what minimal investments we can make to avoid being 
sued”125. While the process of treaty negotiations holds considerable emotional and 
cultural significance for aboriginal communities, the interests of non-aboriginal 
governments operate in different sphere with different priorities. An admission of 
historic injustice by non-aboriginal governments has implications for compensation 
and restitution. In law, to take ownership of injustice is to acknowledge wrongdoing, 
and with that acknowledgement typically comes financial penalty, something that 
governments are typically keen to avoid. Progress is then hampered by the different 
 
124 Glen Coulthard “Subjects of empire: indigenous peoples and the ‘politics of recognition’  
in Canada”. (2007) 6:4 Contemporary Political Theory 437 –60. 
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connotations associated with specific words within the legal vocabulary and the way 
the use of some admission might give credence to any decisions to allocate funds to 
indigenous communities. Once admitted, the process of treating similar situations in 
the same way could implicate the government in a multitude of different situations with 
aboriginal communities, resulting in payments required in excess of what the 
government is able to pay.   
 
Working through the deliberations of the BCTC process, it is evident that jurisdictional 
technologies have the power to shape lawful relations, even from a distance. With 
respect to the content of those negotiations, the acknowledgement and recognition of 
wrongdoing by non-aboriginal governments is necessary for the ontological legitimacy 
of indigenous land claims, while also providing a cornerstone for notions of 
reconciliation. However, the federal representatives cannot interact in a productive 
manner for fear of the ways in which the articulation of various concepts might form 
that attachment of events or persons to the processes of existing law. This is stated 
quite baldly, and is acknowledged by the following admission from a federal 
government representative to the British Columbia Treaty negotiations  
 
First Nations quite often want us to acknowledge something up front, and 
I think there is a real legal concern on the part of vulnerability about some 
bald-faced statement that acknowledges something up front (federal 
representative).126 
 
Specifically, existing Canadian law prompts the Non-Aboriginal governments to 
bracket ideas of compensation as part of different legal framework that simply can’t be 
addressed through the alternative dispute resolution framework of the B.C. Treaty 
Process. From the perspective of a member of the Union of British Columbia Indian 
Chiefs, the efforts of the BCTC process represents the crown’s attempt to “capture and 
tame aboriginal title and rights, and then place them in a cage constructed of words 
and legal provisions” 127 . This notion that words and legal technicalities enclose 
processes of negotiation and the narrative of aboriginal governments in the treaty 
process is one that has not gone unnoticed. However, as Pahuja notes in her article 
regarding encounters of international law, conflicts are often described against the 
backdrop of political social, or economic dispute – rather than through the lens of 




IV. The Shaping of Negotiations through Categorisation 
 
In the context of the BCTC process, categorisation contributes significantly to the 
shape of lawful relations. It speaks to the kinds of categories made available by the 
Crown, as well as the notion that the crown has the ability to define those categories 
to begin with. From the perspective of a praxis of jurisdiction, the most obvious process 
of categorisation is that the kinds of land transfers available in negotiations are only 
 
126 Supra note 68 [BC Task Force Report] at 138. 
 
127 Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs. n.d. “Certainty: Canada’s struggle to extinguish  
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through Fee Simple Title. In a broader sense, the ability to categorise or bracket that 
which can or cannot be included in negotiations can also be seen through the lens of 
jurisdiction. Non-aboriginal governments can pre-determine certain legal practices and 
endeavours as being beyond the scope of negotiation and thereby define away the 
kinds of legal remedies and forms of law available  
 
Despite a narrative that on the face of it provides options for indigenous communities, 
the machinery that categorises the forms that the legal remedies can take naturally 
provides the scaffolding upon which mechanisms for Canadian land claims can attach. 
This underlying architecture need not exclude formulations of indigenous law and 
government, however a close look at the underlying scaffolding in the available options 
indicates an uneven landscape prejudiced against aboriginal nation-building and 
property concepts. The presumption of non-aboriginal governments in their exclusive 
right to define the parameters of negotiation to fit fee simple title, extinguish aboriginal 
title, and bracket discussions of compensation speak to a preordained process where 
the categories are arranged to exclude rather than include. This is a function of 
jurisdiction regardless of a bias towards either inclusion or exclusion, the jurisdictional 
aspect merely comments on the extent to which this technology formulates the 
conduct of lawful relations. 
 
Within the BCTC process particular attention must be paid to the provincial and federal 
government's insistence on fee simple title, the extinguishment of aboriginal title, and 
the bracketing of compensation for historic land takings. Through the process of treaty 
negotiations, the Crown has the authority to offer the transfer of lands in fee simple to 
aboriginal claimants. However, in doing so and in completing the treaty process the 
indigenous communities surrender their interest in aboriginal title to the land. The 
Canadian courts have ruled that the sui generis nature of indigenous ownership 
generates an actual interest in the land, which is ontologically speaking quite different 
from Fee Simple. This type of land ownership will allow for large tracts of land to be 
transferred to aboriginal governments, however the necessity of choosing between 
these types of land ownership is a process wholly controlled by the policy that does 
not allow for anything other than fee simple ownership outside of adversarial 
adjudication in a Canadian court. 
 
The choice between these types of ownership has ramifications for the larger 
questions of jurisdiction, however for the moment they clearly represent the way static 
legal configurations of existing Canadian law are unable to evolve to enfold notions of 
aboriginal ownership. The choice between a court case or treaty negotiations 
preconfigures the kinds of legal remedies available in the BCTC process precisely 
because Canadian law has drawn the parameters. What ideally should be a creative 
and collaborative effort with respect of engineering new ways of being with law is 
stifled by the inflexible framework adhered to by the federal and provincial 
governments. As Nicholas Blomley notes, the refusal of the federal government to 
budge on its insistence on fee simple land ownership has frustrated First Nations 
negotiators as they are forced to embrace the mechanics of their own dispossession128, 
and in so doing adopt the colonial legal order. 
 
128 Nicholas Blomley “Making Space for Property” (2014) 104:1 Annals of the Association of 




With particular attention to the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, despite the pressing 
concern of the HTG, the crown has insisted that it will not negotiate for lands held 
privately. Nor will it negotiate a compensation settlement that would allow the 
Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group to purchase back their traditional lands from the current 
corporate landowners. Further to this, any crown lands that are transferred would be 
transferred as Fee Simple Title, meaning that any existing Aboriginal Title to the land 
would be extinguished by the signing of a treaty.  The emphasis on certainty in the 
B.C. Treaty Process would mean such a treaty would bind future generations in the 
community from seeking other measures to secure their traditional lands and restrict 
the growth and development of the community to the structures imposed by fee simple 
title in what is only a small portion of lands that are claimed by the community. 129 
 
By bracketing notions of historic takings, the government in one fell swoop undermines 
the premise and position from which indigenous governments make claims to their 
traditional territory. If there is no mechanism for the acknowledgement of the territory 
as theirs, there exists no foothold upon which First Nations governments can establish 
a position for negotiations. Specific to land title, non-aboriginal governments are fixed 
in this way of organising land tenure. The way of legally holding land, aside from the 
prickly notions of authorisation, represents the way in which non-aboriginal 
governments can engineer the existing legal processes to exclude alternative 
jurisdictions or overlapping understandings of a relationship with the land through law. 
 
The authority that allows for the categorisation of the forms of legal remedy is where 
this technology of categorisation or meta-governance percolates through to authority 
as a mode of jurisdiction. However, it is important to remember that the perspective 
which divides a jurisdictional approach into different facets is merely a convenient 
method for explaining what might more appropriately be called a jurisdictional mind-
set. The arrangement of where and how lawful relations are established is the project 
of jurisdiction, however a jurisdictional approach does not in itself have an ethic of 
inclusion or exclusion, it merely provides a lens through which to look at the threshold 
of law. However, McVeigh and Dorsett develop an ethic of responsibility that animates 
their account of thinking with jurisdiction. Aside from the forms that jurisdiction can 
take, the notion of taking seriously the quality of ‘belonging to law’ allows for a 
discussion about the texture of that belonging and the modes and manners of coming 
in to law and being with law.   
 
If we conceive of a responsible approach to the conduct of lawful relations which is 
the main organisational theme of a jurisdictional approach, then, as some authors on 
jurisdiction have noted130, a judgement about the nature of that threshold of law and 
what responsible conduct looks like does add a political slant to the use of jurisdiction 
as a critical approach. In this case I will contend that the ethic of making space for new 
and creative lawful relations is the responsible aspect of the conduct of operations. As 
such, the categorisation and use of the technologies of jurisdiction should enable an 
 
129 Supra note 1 [HTG Petition 2007]. 
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equitable meeting of laws, and in contrast to that ethic, the technologies of jurisdiction 




V. The Implications of Authority in the BCTC Process 
 
 
Part of this notion of taking responsibility for the conduct of lawful relations and the 
overlay of the political aspects to jurisdictional thinking becomes more evident once 
we move from the mechanics of jurisdiction to the broader framing of questions of 
authority, authorisation and inauguration. It is evident from an account of the 
technologies of jurisdiction within treaty negotiations in British Columbia, that how the 
legal avenues are organised contributes to how aboriginal land claims are thought 
about, talked about, and brought into the realm of Canadian law. In considering these 
downstream technologies it is evident that that the authorship of the architecture plays 
a central role to its configuration, but beyond that, the use of the technologies of 
jurisdiction have a reciprocal relationship with the modes of authority and 
authorisation. 
 
The acceptance of the language, the bracketing of several key issues, and the 
acknowledgement of the validity associated with the different types of land ownership 
all reinforce an underlying premise that the Crown has the authority to define the 
perimeter within which aboriginal governments can operate. The acceptance and use 
of these technologies of jurisdiction end up influencing and perpetuating the still 
contested premise of Terra Nullius131 and Canadian sovereignty. Samson’s assertion 
that the Canadian Land Claims processes are directed at the control of indigenous 
peoples, a process which was only instigated following “indigenous contestation of the 
unilateral declaration of sovereignty from Canada, a declaration that the Canadian 
Land Claims process assumes to be legitimate”132. From this perspective, it is possible 
to see the ways in which jurisdiction acts to perpetuate existing structures, while also 
reinforcing underlying premises of authority. 
 
This preoccupation with authority is noted not just within the external critical literature, 
but also in Senate reports and the report by Royal commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(RCAP). The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People noted that within treaty 
negotiations the parties begin from opposing positions, where the priority of First 
Nations negotiators are to secure the self-government and monetary transfers to 
provide self-sufficiency and control over lands. In contrast the priority of government 
negotiators is to protect government authority. 133 For example, in entering into Treaty 
 
131 John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia”  
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 58 Can. Geogr., 295. 
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negotiations, the Crown has a blanket policy of a refusal to enter into arbitration. A 
former Associate Deputy Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Dr. Richard 
Van Loon, explained that the refusal to use arbitration is due to “financial 
considerations and a desire to maintain control over determinations related to such 
matters”134. This assertion made to the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples clearly illustrates how the authority to designate jurisdictional mechanisms is 
leveraged by non-aboriginal governments to exclude legal machinery that weakens 
the overarching control and jurisdiction over the whole legal process.  
 
In this case, it is easily evident from the above that the law as it exists certainly isn't 
the law of the Aboriginal Governments involved in the BCTC process, or more 
particularly, not the laws of the Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group. From a jurisdictional 
standpoint, the focus has to be on the mechanisms for coming into law or being with 
law, and the practice of the creation of lawful relations.  It is possible that the existing 
machinery of the BCTC process could contribute to the responsible conduct of lawful 
relations if the jurisdictional arrangements were such that existing mechanisms could 
be productively used. However, “these mechanisms that are available are not being 
used because of the ingrained federal belief that one party to a two-party contract 
should veto all solutions that are not its first preference”135. This unsubtle coercive 
behaviour certainly flies in the face of the responsible conduct of lawful relations. 
Furthermore, it is the authority vested in the canonical arrangement of jurisdictional 
forms that allows non-aboriginal governments to arrange these processes to their own 
advantage. In querying “whose law?”, it is clear that Canadian law does not reflect the 
avowed multicultural aspirations indicated by the federal government, let alone the 
fiduciary responsibilities inherent in the established relationship between the crown 
and Canadian First Nations communities. Hul’qumi’num law has no place in Canadian 
law, and Canadian law is not conducted with sufficient responsibility to engage with 
that which does not reproduce its current hierarchies. 
 
In the BCTC process, reconciliation was conceived of as a final colonial 
act (normalizing the outcome of oppression) that would rationalize and 
make legal Canada's presumption of governing authority.136  
 
As can be seen in the above quote by Woolford, the jurisdictional architecture of the 
BCTC process reinforces the inequitable arrangement of Canadian law. The authority 
to declare what the law is, or could be, rests solely with the Non-Aboriginal 
governments in this context. They are the gatekeepers for the entrance of other laws 
or systems into the Canadian process, and the mechanisms of exclusion permeate 
many of the structures at their inception. Dominating the assumptions that provide a 
foundation for the existing Canadian laws and underwrite the historic struggles of the 
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Hul’qumi’num peoples, is the exercise of Canadian sovereignty and the unquestioning 
assumption of the right to exercise power within the territorial jurisdiction known as 
Canada. Jurisdiction can certainly be easily used to question this foundational premise 
because it speaks to the origin of lawful relations and the antecedent authority to 
engage in them. 
 
Harking back to jurisdiction in its formulation from its Latin roots of ius dicere, the 
attached inference that jurisdiction connotes authority is manifest the crowns ability to 
declare and define the legal architecture. That ability to voice, and in some ways 
create, the scaffolding of lawful relations within the treaty negotiations means that the 
authority that legal practitioners derive through jurisdiction make them the gatekeepers 
for law's scope and framing. The responsibility for building lawful relations is mediated 
through jurisdiction, the praxis of which is a measure of the persons, places, and 





VI. The Premise of Canadian Sovereignty 
 
It is obvious from the outset that if we are to question “whose law?” when it comes to 
the interactions between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal governments, the answer 
rests with the Non-Aboriginal law at it applied in its consistency across the country. 
However, if the initial assumption of the existence of jurisdiction is dispensed with, and 
the questions can evolve from “whose law?” to “does law exist?” and “how should 
lawful relations be established?”. While those types of questions of Jurisdiction remain 
within the domain of law – just – it does make room for a different perspective on law, 
not as a consistent whole, but as an organic amalgamation of processes and practices 
connected together via the technologies of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as evidenced 
by the long history of the legal struggles of the HTG, equality of procedure has no 
guarantee of a just outcome. However, from a jurisdictional perspective, it is possible 
to question how persons or places or events might properly belong to law137. Similarly, 
it is also possible to question if there is space for more than one Law in considering 
the structures and architecture that regulates lawful relations. 
 
If the ways and culture of the First Nations are treated as nothing more than a 
“normative system” and tradition – accounted for as something less than law, “no 
meeting place between laws is possible” 138 And yet, there is every evidence that the 
Hul’qumi’num peoples consider themselves a distinct community separate from 
Canada and British Columbia. They have a separate language, territory that they have 
mapped and demarcated, a distinct community membership, self-government 
arrangements, traditional laws, and an assertion that they live within occupied 
Canada.139  
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The assertions and actions of the Hul’qumi’num would certainly account for what 
Douzinas might term “bare sovereignty” 140 , and yet without the acknowledged 
jurisdiction, or the power to speak in the name of the law and be heard, there is no 
place for Hul’qumi’num legal narrative and therefore no place for a meeting of laws 
between indigenous and non-indigenous governments.  
 
This arrangement of jurisdiction merely makes plain the main aspect implicit in a 
jurisdictional redescription of the HTG’s progression through the BCTC process. The 
authority to declare the law is missing from the Hul’qumi’num narrative. The laws, 
maps, and assertions of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group hold no truth for Canadian 
lawmakers, and the HTG have no leverage with which to press the issue. Indeed, the 
BCTC process requires the acquiescence and an acknowledgement of a system 
whose architecture is wholly unsympathetic to the arrangement of Aboriginal law and 
the laws of the Hul’qumi’num in particular141.  
 
The assumption of being heard is implicit in the notions of authorisation and power 
that are attached to jurisdiction, however the question of who speaks and who listens 
is a central point to any project of reconciliation. According to Walters, this is the 
“unwritten principle” of legality”142 as it pertains to the jurisdictional meeting place of 
laws in Canadian land claims conflicts. However, when looking at the critiques of the 
BCTC process and the lived experiences of the participants, there seems to be no 
forum within which Hul’qumi’num narratives are received with any legal meaning. The 
question of “whose law?” as it arose in the overview of jurisdictional authority at the 
BCTC Process as an account of lawful relations is answered as: evidently not that of 
the indigenous inhabitants of Canada. While this is not unexpected, the prior question 
of “does law exist?” is provoked specifically by a jurisdictional look at the competing 
layers of legal process and further allows for a different answer than might be expected 
of a traditional downstream positivist account of lawful interaction and typical 
jurisdictional arrangement of legal processes.  
 
The overwhelming sense from the First Nations communities is that the B.C. Treaty 
Process has failed in its attempt at reconciliation. The values that were set out by the 
British Columbia Treaty Commission are sufficiently vague that they can be reworked 
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into competitive interest-based bargaining rather than the honest, truthful, and open 
dialogue envisioned by the original Task Force.143 With this in mind, consider the 
possibilities of the absent narrative of the jurisdiction to declare the structure of law in 
the negotiations between the Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group and the BCTC process. The 
authority to declare the parameters of lawful relations plays a pivotal role in the 
establishment of the legal architecture. There is no legal or physical space for the HTG 
to declare their facts as the truth regarding the ownership of traditional lands in British 
Columbia. By limiting negotiations to lands currently held by the crown, the implicit 
declaration by the non-aboriginal governments is that the lands do belong to them, 
and privately held lands were justly transferred from the crown as the original 
landholder. By transferring the lands as fee simple, the jurisdictional implication is also 
that the legal scaffolding supports actual title to the land via the crown. There is no 
legal space to establish an equal foundation that acknowledges an equal truth of 
Aboriginal law and government.  
 
The jurisdiction to define the perimeter of negotiations and design the structure of 
lawful relations unsurprisingly means that the legal relationships generated by the 
process are actually dictated by the ones responsible for the design. This is obviously 
an unfortunate outcome of a reconciliation process that was supposed to generate 
new forms of legal negotiations. The architecture of lawful relations shapes the ways 
in which people, places, and events are tied to law. This means that through 
jurisdiction one can see the juncture at which individuals act and react to that 
architecture. The technologies of jurisdiction are not just manifest in the design of the 
legal scaffolding, but are also evident in the ways the relationships are enacted by the 
representatives. The perimeters of law are defined away through the jurisdiction of 
language, and from language to thought. The technologies of jurisdiction make contact 
through the language used by the legal actors, until the mechanisms for even 
conceiving of a different law are regulated by the dominant legal framework.  
 
In the specific context of the Hul'qumi'num negotiations, one of the main barriers to 
negotiation is that any acknowledgment of compensation has a legal ramification, and 
by bringing negotiations of compensation to the table, the way is opened for legal 
precedent to require payment in damages that exceeds the capacity of the government 
to pay144. The Crown, because of the practicalities of the case, would prefer to delimit 
the way in which notions of accountability with respect to indigenous populations enter 
into the realm of law. Because of the automatic power wielded by the federal and 
provincial governments, they presume to have the jurisdiction to bracket legal 
discussions 145  and so shape the law in their own self-interest. This shapes the 
possibilities for the legal remedies through treaty negotiations, but also completely 
negates the ability of the Hul’qumi’num Peoples to even voice a narrative that speaks 
to indigenous laws, governance, and restitution based on historic framing of a distinct 
society and rights to the land. Even if voiced, there is no legal space in which such an 
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utterance could be heard. So, while it might prove that the HTG could establish a 
jurisdiction unto themselves in the inauguration of their own law, to speak the law is 
not enough in this instance, there needs to first be room for an understanding of more 

















































CHAPTER 3. CONFIGURATIONS OF JURISDICTION AT THE IACHR 
 
 
I. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
Chapter Two has indicated that it has been the privilege of Canada to declare the 
perimeter of law within which the Hul’qumi’num interests can be negotiated in the 
British Columbia Treaty Process. These negotiations happen both within the physical 
boundary of British Columbia as well as within the legal space designed by the British 
Columbia Treaty Commission. These negotiations have the capacity to transfer lands 
in fee-simple and agree to monetary transfer through the creation of modern-day 
treaties.  The negotiations are confidential in nature, as is reiterated by the Canadian 
representatives in the case at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights146. 
The account presented in chapter two indicates that the jurisdictional assemblages 
are arranged in a way so as to create an impermeable threshold between Indigenous 
and Non-aboriginal law, with the jurisdictional technologies and practices enshrined 
that preclude notions of Hul’qumi’num law and nation-building.  
 
At the failure of the BCTC process, the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group took their case to 
an international forum. The jurisdictional forms reproduced at the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) are configured differently because of the 
differences in the underlying architecture. The arguments before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights will naturally be of a different kind than the legal 
mechanisms within the Canadian state, which rely on treaty making via the BCTC 
process and the judicial review of Aboriginal title, which at the time of this case had 
proceeded no further than the original decisions in Delgamuukw 147. That is to say, an 
“unprecedented theoretical framework”148 for the interpretation of Aboriginal title had 
been delivered and the protections of section 35 of Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms149 (CCRF, or The Charter) deliberated, but the end result was that the court 
failed to rule on the merits of the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Aboriginal title claim.150 
Despite the protections afforded in the Charter as it came into force in 1982 as a 
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constitutional document151, as of 2011 there had been no successful Aboriginal Title 
claims made by indigenous communities in Canada. 152  On May 10, 2007 the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights against Canada. Admissibility hearings took place in October 2008 and 
Mach of 2009. The commission issued its admissibility report in October 2009 
indicating that the Inter-American Commission did have the jurisdiction to hear the 
case. The case was presented to the commission in October 2011153. 
 
In considering the conduct of lawful relations between Canada and the Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group at the IACHR, There is a distinction to be made between evaluating the 
jurisdictional modes and manners of being with law that are available through the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, and the configuration of a praxis of 
jurisdiction as it is applied to a case whilst it proceeds through the processes. The 
latter approach borrows significantly from the former, because the existing 
jurisdictional architecture naturally shapes how the particulars of the case are treated, 
however the jurisdictional practices will always exist in context rather than at a distance 
from the case. In this chapter, jurisdiction as it has been characterised through the 
lens of representation authorisation and inauguration is explored through the 
progression of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group case, from the admissibility hearing 
through to the case arguments. The technologies and modes of jurisdiction remain the 
same, while the interaction and conduct of lawful relations differs. This chapter uses 
the practice of jurisdiction to re-describe the narrative of lawful relations at the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. As the HTG brings a claim against Canada 
in respect of the violation of their rights, the representation authorisation and 
inauguration of the specific international jurisdiction are examined. 
 
To put the international jurisdiction in context, the Organisation of American States 
(OAS)154 is an international body that is responsible for overseeing the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The 
OAS represents the alliance in international law between North and South American 
states, including Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America. The extent to 
which nation-states are bound to these international instruments is based on their 
status as signatories to the various documents. Canada, as a member, is bound by 
international convention to abide by the charter documents, which includes The 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man155. However, Canada is not a 
full signatory to all of the treaties and therefore cannot be prosecuted at the Inter-
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Organisation of American States, there is some recourse available via the Inter-
American Commission. The foundational document of the OAS is a starting point for 
the jurisprudence of the IACHR, meaning that the legal landscape is unencumbered 
by older overlapping jurisdictional forms. Along with the other Articles cited by the 
HTG, The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man does stipulate a right 
to property, meaning that Canada can be held to a human rights code that is more 
robust than that enshrined in its own constitution, as a right property is notably absent 




II. Representations of Jurisdiction through Writing at the IACHR 
 
In the previous chapter the technologies of writing and precedent were interlinked, with 
the enunciation of law the central theme that tied the two facets of jurisdictional 
representations together. From a jurisdictional perspective, it is not necessarily the 
content of what is said or written, instead, the ways in which it can be articulated. 
During the HTG case there were two admissibility hearings, followed by a report by 
the Commission on the admissibility of the case to the IACHR. The Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group presented written submissions to the commission, which detailed their 
legal struggles within Canada and the current mechanisms available to indigenous 
peoples with respect to legal protections over their traditional lands. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights is bound by the conventions of international 
law not to interfere within sovereign jurisdictions, with provisions written in with regards 
to specific exceptions. During the hearings Canada argued that the IACHR did not 
have the jurisdiction to hear the case because the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group had not 
met the requirement of exhausting all domestic remedies. In this instance, it would be 
to pursue a case for Aboriginal Title through the judicial system in order to secure 
protections over their traditional lands. The HTG elected not to pursue this avenue, as 
at the time they had yet to be successful implementation of aboriginal title that granted 
the title in privately held lands157 
 
From the perspective of the underlying architecture, arguments made to the IACHR 
must be framed according to their structuring mechanism, which in this case is the 
language of human rights. Human rights brings with it the configuration of the 
individual as the primary organising feature of lawful relations. However, because of 
the language of rights in the legal sphere, one can use that language to bring about 
an attachment to the body of law that is different in texture and in content. As a 
technology of jurisdiction, a robust written jurisprudence of human rights provides a 
different avenue of entrance or attachment to the body of law. The nature of an 
international system for law would naturally take into account in its architecture the 
need to accommodate different notions of law and nationality, although this is by no 
means a given. The extent to which the IACHR does this provides a positive step 
towards not just a different mechanism for attaching indigenous land rights to the body 
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of Canadian jurisprudence, but due to the language of the framing it also provides a 
first step in taking seriously an account of the quality of lawful relations.  
 
The arguments made at the IACHR are largely similar in content to that which was 
argued at the BCTC process.158 However, from the perspective of available literature 
there are a few fundamental differences. Rather than being stifled by the non-
aboriginal government’s insistence on confidentiality, the petitions made to the IACHR 
are written down, and decisions rendered in a public forum. With respect to available 
texts, the admissibility hearings and case oral arguments are available via the records 
kept by the Organisation of American States. These records are maintained as audio 
files, so it is possible to listen to the arguments made by both sides through each step 
of the process.  
 
During the hearings and case arguments, one of the elders with the title of Loschiem, 
or medicine person, is able to speak about the experiences of his people. He gives an 
account of the needs and views of his people, and their fears regarding their 
environment and the sustainability of their community159. To the extent that recordings 
can be considered a text of the testimony of the Hul’qumi’num people, this speech in 
itself represents a way for indigenous knowledge to enter the existing international 
legal framework. Considering how jurisdiction underwrites the conduct of lawful 
relations, the articulation and representation of Hul’qumi’num truths in this manner 
illustrates how practices of the IACHR influence how the HTG enter the purview 
international law. The manner of being with law through written language, or in this 
case text, exemplifies the way that the smallest technologies of jurisdiction underwrites 
the machinery of the legal process, which can differ significantly between different 
venues. Despite the fact that these arguments and representations have been made 
before in a different forum, their new existence through an accessible text lends 
different weight to the account. 
 
While the IACHR has room for the testimony of community members, the argument 
still needs to be framed through the language of a rights framework. To the extent that 
it is possible, the language of human rights represents an attempt at a universal frame 
of reference. Despite being formalised method of negotiating the rights and wrongs of 
disputing parties, it is nonetheless consistent. By using this framework, the 
representations and ideas put forward by the HTG are harnessed and tethered to pre-
existing nations of a common vernacular. The language and text of human rights can 
be considered a technology of jurisdiction in the manner of writing, and to a certain 
extent precedent. As with the jurisdictional approach to the text of oral arguments, the 
language of human rights is a vehicle for re-imagining jurisdiction. The content of the 
argument, while relevant to the progression of the case, is less important than how 
those arguments are made and represented. The language of human rights and the 
enduring representations through text of the arguments made before the IACHR 
constitute the machinery makes contact with aboriginal laws and meaning. 
 
158 Supra note 11 [Case Merits Observations, 2010] 
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In broader terms, the fact that the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights speaks specifically to legal culture and ownership systems means that 
via the avenue of human rights through which the arguments have to be made, there 
is none-the-less room to ground other ways of modes of being with law through those 
human rights. In this case the human rights parlance allows for a jurisprudence of 
jurisdiction whereby the legal cultures of indigenous communities are brought towards 
the body of existing law. Not only does the architecture of the system allow for a 
language that accommodates the ideas of indigenous law and nationhood, but that 
language also attempts to deconstruct the practices and processes of exclusionary 
language that forms the basis for a construction of legal mechanisms of 
marginalisation. From the perspective of the HTG Chief Negotiator, despite the 
possible problems of enforceability and international law, this movement from 
domestic to international jurisdiction is a movement in the right direction. In his 
presentation to Lawyers Right Watch Canada, Robert Morales compares the two 
systems, saying “[S]o the international system has really developed those principles… 
that can help to counterbalance those old attitudes, and they’re based on human 
rights”160. 
 
Despite similar assertions made by the HTG within BCTC process and Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the way the technologies of writing and its relationship 
to language and text are implemented is quite different. The undocumented nature of 
negotiations within BCTC process render the technologies of jurisdiction through 
writing virtually inaccessible. In contrast, the IACHR is organised in such a way that 
this technology of jurisdiction represents a viable practice through which indigenous 




III. The Technology of Precedent in an International Jurisdiction 
 
During oral arguments at the IACHR the Hul'qumi'num are actually able to make 
reference to the specific jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission. Because of 
the similar cases heard at the IACHR, the HTG were able to leveraged similarities of 
their case within an international context of indigenous communities. Is allowed the 
HTG to become part of the jurisprudence of the IACHR when it decided in favour of 
the admissibility of the case, connecting the HTG community to other efforts of 
indigenous peoples internationally. In this way, the HTG were brought in to genuine 
contact and connected to a growing body of law at international level. 
 
To progress through the admissibility hearings the HTG have argued successfully in 
favour of harnessing themselves to the prior precedent that allows the exemption from 
the stipulation that it is necessary to exhaust domestic measures prior to approaching 
the Inter-American Commission. The lawyer for the HTG explicitly argues for the 
apparent connections through precedent to prior decisions regarding the case of the 
 
160 Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, “Robert Morales: Seeking Justice Elsewhere”  
February 23rd 2012, online: lrwc <http://www.lrwc.org/video-seeking-justice-
elsewhere/>[Robert Morales: Justice Elsewhere] at 00h: 42m :36s. 
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Saramaka People161, the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community162, and the case of 
the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community in Paraguay. 163  In this way use of 
precedent as a technology for jurisdiction is quite evident, as HTG are now linked 
through precedent to a body of written decisions, which to a certain extent now 
constitute building block in the body of international law and jurisprudence. As a 
practice of jurisdiction, the legal precedents presented by the international sphere 
mediated the experience of the HTG at the threshold of its interaction with the body of 
international law. Examining all the assertions made by the HTG in their admissibility 
arguments, and treating does oral arguments as a text, is possible to see the ways in 
which technology of precedent within the jurisprudence of the IACHR enables the 
progression of HTG case. This appeal is made possible because of the prior body of 
previous decisions catalogued and referenced within the Inter-American Commission. 
These are illustrative of the ways indigenous communities can create connections 
within law and to each other via use of the jurisdictional technology of legal precedent.  
 
In precise terms, the jurisprudence of the IACHR not only affirms the special 
connection between indigenous notions of land, ownership, culture, and identity – but 
explicitly recognises in its decisions the equality of other land ownership mechanisms 
and the existence of Indigenous law. The jurisprudence of the IACHR supports framing 
that embeds notions of communal property with the wellbeing of indigenous 
communities and the rights of those communities to the lands and resources that were 
traditionally theirs. In their report entitled “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over 
Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Human Rights System”, they state at the outset that: 
 
Preserving the particular connection between indigenous communities 
and their lands and resources is linked to these peoples’ very existence 
and thus “warrants special measures of protection.” The Inter-
American Court has insisted that States must respect the special 
relationship that members of indigenous and tribal peoples have with 
their territory in a way that guarantees their social, cultural, and 
economic survival.164   
  
The written jurisprudence reflects a different conceptualisation of the notions of being 
with law and notions of other law.  The jurisprudence no only affirms the special 
connection between indigenous notions of land, ownership, culture, and identity – but 
 
161 Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (2007). Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser. C) No. 172,  
 Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs at para. 96. 
 
162 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Judgment of August  
 24, 2010) Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser. C) No.214, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
 
163 Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. (Judgment of March  
 29, 2006). Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser. C) No.146, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
164 OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’  
Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 
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explicitly recognises in its decisions the equality of other land ownership mechanisms 
and the existence of Indigenous law.  
   
[t]his notion of ownership and possession of land does not necessarily 
conform to the classic concept of property, but deserves equal 
protection under Article 21 of the American Convention… Disregard for 
specific versions of use and enjoyment of property springing from the 
culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, would be 
tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using and disposing 
of property, which, in turn, would render protection under Article 21 of 
the Convention illusory for millions of persons.165 
 
The use of Article 21, equal protection under law, and its reference to different notions 
of land ownership along with the statement that legal protections would be illusory if 
the existence of other mechanisms for relating to the land were not acknowledged, 
makes a bold step towards a meeting place for lawful relations and the language of 
recognition. The use of legal precedent is only possible because of the jurisprudence 
that recognises indigenous law. Without that, these notions would be excluded from 




IV. The Jurisdictional praxis of Categorisation at the IACHR  
 
The jurisdictional arrangements are mediated by international convention, and flow 
from the founding document of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man. with regards to the general construction other legal processes within the IACHR, 
the meta-governance aspects of the jurisdictional practice of categorisation is mostly 
absent due to the absence of complex hierarchical structure. The case is mediated 
through a filter of human rights, rather than pre-filtered by prior categorisation into 
varying legal boxes. Regardless, there is still a very prominent jurisdictional question 
of category that acts as a gatekeeper for the threshold of the commission's purview. 
As has already been mentioned, by international convention, applicants to the IACHR 
must exhaust all domestic remedies before moving their arguments to the international 
sphere. However, this technology is perhaps the most obvious because it is configured 
through a specific legal process – namely a hearing – that determines admissibility of 
the case to the IACHR.166  
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On the face of it, there are mechanisms in place to account for the negotiation of First 
Nations claims to traditional territory in British Columbia. Law does exist and it is the 
law of Canada, making it the only law in a philosophically modern sense of the word167. 
The law of Canada is Canadian law. In fact, this is the assertion made by the 
government of Canada representatives at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Right at the two admissibility hearings. They maintain that the actions of the state 
through the existing constitutional protections and the prospect of Aboriginal title 
through judicial review demonstrate that even aside from the BCTC process that 
provides for the negotiation of modern treaties, there are still legal avenues available 
to the First Nations communities of Canada.168 From this perspective, law does exist, 
and exists equally for all Canadians, as it is Canadian law.  
 
Notably, the HTG successfully argue that the existing domestic remedies do not 
constitute any real measure of protection in a timely manner for their traditional lands. 
The commission agreed with HTG, condemning the processes of the British Columbia 
treaty commission and the access to Aboriginal Title. In the admissibility hearings, the 
Crown does make an attempt to bracket various aspects of the case in order to define 
them away from the jurisdiction of the IACHR. The federal government initially argues 
that they have provided sufficient domestic options for indigenous peoples to pursue 
the land claims in Canada. When this approach proves unsuccessful, the crown 
continues to categorise aspects of the case and their attendant responsibilities as 
being beyond the reasonable reach of the state. 
 
Specifically, Canada argued that its failure to demarcate and thereby protect the lands 
of the Hul’qumi’num is based on the fact that there are overlapping claims to this land 
with at least eighteen other first Nations laying claim to land in Vancouver Island, 
British Columbia169. This myopic focus on single layer jurisdiction is evident both in the 
Crown's actions at the BCTC process and this particular argument made at the 
international level, that competing and overlapping claims to jurisdiction free the crown 
from any responsibility to protect those lands. This is countered by the fact that First 
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Nations governments who are the authors of these so-called competing claims, have 
nonetheless filed amici briefs alongside the Hul'qumi'num petition that supports its 
endeavour, and declare themselves willing to negotiate together to resolve the legal 
implications of overlapping land tenure. 
 
Another argument used by the federal government in its attempt at re-categorisation 
is the argument that the HTG case is primarily about compensation for the historic 
takings of the land. Historical wrongs might reasonably be outside the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Commission, as the original takings occurred in the 1800s, and the 
commission was set up in the 1990s.170 The purview of the IACHR to hear such a case 
is an argument that is queried by the judge overseeing the arguments, however, the 
new destruction of the natural environment in recent years constitutes a contemporary 
context for the HTG's request for precautionary measures against the clear-cutting in 
the traditional lands while Canada addresses the unresolved land claims issues  
 
The framing of these two arguments along with the initial challenge to jurisdiction 
illustrates the ways in which categorisation as a technology can have a profound effect 
on how persons, places, and events might enter into and belong to Law. In different 
circumstances, these arguments for reclassification might have been successful, 
further bracketing various aspects of the HTG case. Indeed, in order to proceed, the 
focus has been on recent destruction of traditional lands rather than compensation for 
the historic takings. In this way, the necessity of approaching specific legal interactions 
has caused the HTG to bracket aspects of their own understanding of the situation in 
order to move forward within the confines of the available legal spheres. The IACHR 
received submissions regarding the historical struggles of the HTG to find a legal 
solution, which informed the decisions made by the commission. However, 
negotiations of compensation are outside the purview of the commission and 
represent the temporal aspect of categorisation which limits the nature of legal 
relationships. 
 
Categorisation is a practice of jurisdiction can have transformative results, as it directly 
and indirectly mediates the delineated steps through existing legal processes. In this 
situation, it is easy to see how the attempts at categorisation illustrate the means by 
which persons, places and events and even communities can be included or excluded 




V. Authority and Authorisation in an International Human Rights Context 
 
The problems associated with international law falls squarely within the purview of the 
jurisdictional look at the mechanisms for authority and authorisation. The technologies 
that attach persons, places, and events to existing legal framework are in some ways 
simpler at the international level. The language of rights as jurisdictional technology 
and the existing body of international jurisprudence have already been touched upon 
as consistent and flexible mediators of lawful relations. In contrast, the authority to 





somewhat more complicated. The Inter-American Commission is authorised and given 
shape by the consent of the sovereign nations that are party to it. The legal and 
ontological arguments for human rights are harnessed to the language used in the 
decisions of the Commission and given the appropriate weight. However, despite The 
Commission's ability to conceive of other ways of being with law, and to filter those 
laws through its human rights framework, it is nonetheless limited by the most 
straightforward aspect of jurisdictional ordering. The Commission does not have the 
coercive authority, regardless of its judgement, to compel a country to abide by the 
decisions of the IACHR. The Commission might have the authority to speak in the 
name of the law as it has been agreed between nation-states, but without a means of 
enforceability, the decisions of the IACHR do not represent ways for other 
configurations of laws to enter domestic law through the impenetrable perimeter of 
sovereignty. The Commission can only ever speak to its own perimeter of law. In this 
way, to a certain extent, cases of this kind vacate jurisdictional theory for the realm of 
sovereignty and politics. 
 
Aside from the limitations of international law, the connotations of authority with 
respect to jurisdiction still carry weight. Referring back to Peter Rush’s account of 
jurisdiction and the action of speaking in the name of the law, we can approach this 
case from that particular aspect of speech. Implicit in the connotations of speaking 
aloud in the name of the law, is possibly the notion that there exists a community in 
existence to hear you. It is this aspect of speaking from the existence of law that is 
silent in some of the prior processes. We have seen how processes and technologies 
of jurisdiction mediate how those notions articulated. 
 
Particular to the HTG context, any arguments made in the space of the BCTC process 
are unheard by any parties external to that endeavour, as the negotiations are kept 
confidential. If constrained by the perimeter set by Canada with regards to interest-
based negotiations and the refusal to negotiate title to privately-held lands, any 
declaration of Hul’qumi’num truths or Hul’qumi’num laws remain unheard and 
therefore in some sense unspoken. Given that we might argue that Canada has 
vacated its duty to listen attentively and act in a fiduciary manner171, despite any 
utterance of the framing of indigenous law and truth in any negotiation process, there 
exists no one to listen. Canada is seemingly deaf to any such declaration, and 
nowhere in any of the texts generated by the case before the IACHR or the discussions 
of the BCTC process is there any reference made to the prospect of Hul’qumi’num 
laws. 
 
Canada's disinclination to acknowledge Indigenous law is illustrated not just in the 
absent narrative adjacent to the British Columbia treaty process, but also in the way 
in which the parties at the IACHR speak about the case. The non-aboriginal 
government representatives approach the facts of the case with a different texture 
than the HTG. The Crown representative who argues the case before The 
Commission is recorded as saying the following: 
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The key to the allegations of violations in this petition appears to be the 
allegations in respect to the right property. In essence, the HTG alleges 
that Canada must demarcate the land contained in its claim to ancestral 
territory, and should have done so long ago. All other allegations of the 
petitioner flow from this central issue. Canada takes issue with all aspects 
of the petition. An essential element of its defence, however, is the 
significant gap between what the HTG claim is their property or their 
ancestral territory on the one hand, and on the other hand what in fact are 
the property rights of the HTG.172 
 
 
What is evident from this text of the oral arguments is the presumption of the Crown 
to authorise and limit the HTG property rights. This gap between "claim" and "are" so 
to speak uncovers not just the bias in the language, but the presumption that Canada 
has the authority to speak about the laws for the Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group. The 
federal representative goes on to say that "This claim has never been proven. It has 
never been subjected to a determination by a domestic decision maker". This 
assertion indicates a viewpoint that conceives of only one law for Canada, and the 
locus for the authority of that law rests firmly with the federal government. Despite its 
arguments before an international body, the arguments made by the Crown do not 
seem to reflect any understanding of flexibility with respect to other authorities other 
methods of authorisation. These arguments seem to reflect a position that conceives 
of authority is being mapped directly onto geography, making it synonymous with 
notions of territorial sovereignty. 
 
Despite this intransigent view by federal representatives, it is clear from prior chapters 
that authority is not necessarily vested in territorial sovereignty, and it is this aspect of 
jurisdiction that allows one to distinguish it from discussions of sovereignty. While the 
Inter-American Commission might not have the authorisation to compel nations-states 
to comply with its decisions, it does represent an endeavour where jurisdiction is not 
mapped onto physical space, but extended through agreements and ideas to occupy 
the metaphorical space between nations. The scaffolding for the IACHR it is built 
around a jurisdictional authority that is vested outside a specific geography. While as 
an organisation it is still shaped by the building blocks of sovereign nations, it actually 
represents a jurisdiction that need not align itself with a particular place. 
 
At the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the authority to speak in the 
name of the law is vested outside the specific spaces contained within typical notions 
of territorial sovereignty. Irrespective of this, this framing of the organising structure is 
not manifest in the oral arguments made by the Canadian state as is illustrated in its 
myopic focus and adherence to the one configuration of Canadian law vested in the 
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V1. Inauguration as a Praxis of Jurisdiction at Law’s Threshold  
 
 
Inauguration represents the broader questions of law, writ large so to speak. 
Conceiving of a jurisdictional address from the very limits of its capacity, jurisdiction 
represents the best approach from which to view the space outside law’s domain. Law 
does not see very far past that which it does not encompass, however this notion of 
giving oneself the law implicitly extends the focus beyond the boundaries what already 
exists. To this extent, the IACHR is better able to conceive that which is beyond it. 
 
In lectures given by the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group’s Chief Negotiator Robert 
Morales, it is clear that part of the motivation for bringing this case is that the “Inter-
American Commission starts out with the premise of ownership” by the indigenous 
inhabitants of the land173. While the assumption of ownership is not something overtly 
mentioned in the laws of Canada, the myopic focus on territorial sovereignty excludes 
the possibility of the above premise because it is not internally consistent with 
Canadian jurisdiction. In evaluating a space for the meeting place of laws and the 
conduct of lawful relations, this type of architecture is essential to the framing of any 
negotiations or decisions that are implemented by the Commission. 
 
The creation of the space as one for the meeting place of laws is supported by the 
documents of the commission with respect to indigenous peoples and recognition of 
their traditional lands. 
 
The right to indigenous communal property is also grounded in 
indigenous legal cultures, and in their ancestral ownership systems, 
independent of state recognition. The origin of indigenous and tribal 
peoples’ property rights is, therefore, also found in the customary 
system of land tenure that has traditionally existed among the 
communities.174 
 
The critical part of this quote is the reference that is made to state recognition. The 
recognition of prior legal cultures is not foreclosed upon by a framework of human 
rights, and therefore has a place at IACHR. The more significant questions of “does 
law exist?” Are clearly evident in how the Inter-American Commission conducts lawful 
relations. In the interplay between sovereignty and inauguration, in the configuration 
where the community gives itself the law and thereby inaugurates itself in law as a 
formulation of their sovereignty, the existence and practice of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty 
Group as an independent entity before the IACHR certainly constitutes such formation. 
As a site or space for enunciation, the IACHR performed its purpose and provides a 
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stage upon which the aboriginal governments that constitute the Hul’qumi’num Treaty 
Group can declare the existence of their own law.   
 
Indigenous nationhood is evident from how the Hul’qumi’num comport themselves in 
the evidence before The Commission. The elder and medicine person from the 
Cowichan tribe introduces himself in the following manner when asked to identify his 
nationality for The Commission. “… Thank you, I am known as Loschiem in our 
community. My English name is Charlie, Arvid Patrick Charlie.  My Nationality 
is…would be Canadian, but we’re Coast Salish, (Hul’qumi’num language) Indian” 175. 
This statement by Hul’qumi’num member Loschiem is indicative of the community and 
the way in which it conceives of its laws and practices, and how they relate to the 
overriding Canadian jurisdiction. Such a statement might have been articulated at the 
BCTC process, however, there is no way of knowing if this is the case without any 
written documentation. There would be no way this for such a declaration of 
indigenous nationhood to enter into the text or jurisprudence of Canadian law, and 
without witnesses, the state has no impetus to recognise a perspective that exists 
outside its own interpretations of correct lawful relations. As it is, the assertions and 
perspectives of HTG at least documented, and speak to a system of laws and culture 
that in no way needs validating by the Canadian the mechanisms beyond their 
acknowledgement of its existence. The IACHR creates the space for this utterance 
because it is designed in a way to create space for alternative lawful relations and in 
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I. Representations of Writing and Language 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the notion of thinking with jurisdiction and why it can be 
considered a productive lens through which to filter concerns over the conduct of lawful 
relations. Chapter 2 analysed the British Columbia Treaty commissioned process and 
its interaction with the HTG through a selection of jurisdictional approaches. Chapter 
3 addressed the meeting place of the Inter-American Commission on human rights 
and the way in which that influenced the jurisdictional assemblages that influence the 
relations between the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group and the Canadian state. Chapter 4 
will bring together these observations and compare the ways in which thinking with 
jurisdiction can uncover the machinery of inclusion or exclusion that operates at the 
threshold of legal relationships. 
 
The technologies of writing and precedent came to the fore in their absence as a 
productive mechanism for change in the British Columbia treaty commission process 
as compared to the IACHR. Because the negotiations are kept confidential, the quasi-
legal nature of negotiations operates at the far reaches of the mechanisms by which 
persons places and events are attached to the body of law. As representations of 
jurisdiction, the connection is drawn between the language and texts available 
surrounding the British Columbia Treaty Commission process and the jurisdictional 
technology of writing. Operating at the edges of legal relations is the ways in which 
language influences the conduct of lawful relations through jurisdiction. This is seen 
in the casual use of language by the participants in the negotiations. The way in which 
legal mechanisms are spoken about, and that extent thought about, influences the 
conduct of the legal actors and the communication between the parties. The 
vocabulary of non-aboriginal governments is indicative of the legal mechanisms they 
make available for indigenous communities. The use of the vocabulary of non-
aboriginal and aboriginal governments is not one that is seen in the negotiations or 
comments by federal or provincial representatives. Using the vocabulary of aboriginal 
government as the frame of reference is absent even from most of the critical 
academic literature and Senate committee documents surrounding the British 
Columbia Treaty Commission process.  
 
These BCTC negotiations, while secret, are the precursor to written documents that 
bind indigenous communities to particular ways of being with law for the foreseeable 
future. The ways in which the prospective relationship are discussed and formulated 
will naturally underwrite the outcome of treaty negotiations. The federal and provincial 
government negotiators have used the language of certainty and honesty that is 
written into the BC claims task force report and the commission documents to advance 
the agenda of interest-based negotiations, where certainty is conceived of as 
economic certainty, and defining the limits of possible remedies is interpreted as 
honesty. To this end, the non-aboriginal government representatives use what little is 
written down to manipulate the process in a way that defines what can be talked about 
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and how. To that end, this notion of symbolic violence put forward by Woolford's 
critique of the BCTC process is given shape. By defining the perimeter of lawful 
relations through language, the non-aboriginal governments make it difficult to speak 
and even think beyond the parameters that they engineer176. In this way, the use of 
language works in both directions, both to continue the work of assimilation by 
reframing indigenous knowledge through colonial language, but also to perpetuate the 
jurisdictional configurations through language into increasingly formal documents that 
enclose indigenous law, policy, and culture within the perimeter of Canadian law. 
There is further work to be done from this perspective, a productive endeavour being 
a close look at the specific negotiation language over the years of negotiations and 
following the language through to the resulting treaty documents. From the 
perspective of legal language as a technology of jurisdiction, this type of investigation 
could provide a more robust look at how the language used by federal and provincial 
representatives shapes the entrance of aboriginal governments into the domain of 
Canadian law through jurisdictional technologies. 
 
Despite the limits of available written documentation around the BCTC process, once 
the case moves into the international forum the arguments before the Commission are 
recorded, and this generates a text from which to build a picture of the Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group legal arguments and lived experiences. Unlike the subtle ways in which 
language was linked to jurisdiction in chapter two, the manifestation of jurisdiction as 
a technology through a practice of writing or the generation of the text is much more 
obvious. The fact that there is a record within the legal proceeding of the experiences 
of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group nations, already indicates the initial mechanisms by 
which they may contact with the network of international jurisprudence. Spoken aloud 
before an impartial third party and recorded, the arguments and experiences enter into 
the realm of jurisdiction. 
 
However, the international sphere is not without a language of its own through which 
arguments must be filtered in order to be heard. In this case, it is not possible to escape 
jurisdictional ordering of some kind that organises the way in which the conflict of laws 
must be discussed. At the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, this 
language and the attendant weight of law harnessed to it are manifest through the 
language of human rights. A human rights framework ontologically organises its 
mechanism for understanding around the individual, which is at once at odds with 
indigenous notions of collective property ownership. That being said, the IACHR in 
particular has mitigated the effects of this organising technology through its existing 
jurisprudence and reports that emphasise equality before the law - and with that the 
notion that respects the other laws of indigenous communities and in many cases the 
particular relationship with property.  
 
As a technology of jurisdiction, the practice of writing down interactions in the legal 
sphere crafts the ways in which the conduct of law is approached and practised. 
Language as an extension of this writing process shapes the way persons, places, or 
events interact with the codified law. The use of this technology to either include or 
exclude from existing domains of law can either be written into the pre-crafted 
 
176 Supra note 67 [Woolford Symbolic Violence]. 
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organisation of lawful relations or implemented by legal actors as a practice that has 
the capacity to generate an outcome of their own design.   
 
While Canada and the providence of British Colombia have the capacity to use this 
approach in its informality to subdue and subvert indigenous law and nation-
building177, the readily available texts at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights quite openly attempt to create a common language to open a border between 
existing laws and the persons, places, or events, that might be tethered to them. While 
both situations use language in arguments and negotiations as precursors to written 
documents that engineer the type of belonging to law, the attendant processes of the 
IACHR attempts to mitigate any bias in the crafting that underwrites that platform. 
Conversely, there is evidence to suggest that Canada manipulate the law through 
language to exclude indigenous notions of law, property, and culture. 
 
The weight and legitimacy of any declaration or framing of indigenous law are absent 
from the language used by the non-aboriginal governments. The BCTC process has 
failed to exist as a meeting place of laws for the HTG, as the laws of the Hul'qumi'num 
Peoples go unrecognised and unheard. As a meeting place for laws, the IACHR 
provides a vastly different space both in the form and function of the prospective 
creation of lawful relations. as a party outside the sphere of Canadian interests, the 
IACHR by its very nature provides a separate space in which to bear witness to the 
voices of the Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group. Even if Canada chooses to remain deaf to 
the arguments and legal narrative of the Hul’qumi’num Peoples, the mere fact of a 
different space makes the voicing and demarcation of indigenous lands and narrative 
a new endeavour. By considering a jurisdictional account of this movement of the 
conflict from the BCTC to the IACHR, we are able to see that the law that exists is 
‘Canadian law’, and while laws of the Hul'qumi'num do exist and run in parallel, they 
have no power through jurisdiction to be acknowledged by the Canadian state, and no 




II. Precedent and Jurisprudence 
 
 
As with language and the act of writing, the technology of precedent can be used as 
a piece of jurisdictional machinery to tether persons, places, or events, and in some 
cases, communities 178  to a more extensive network of law both spatially and 
temporally. As a cornerstone of common law, the considerations of precedent feature 
largely in all aspects of formal arrangements of law, in part because it carries with it 
notions of liability. This situates parties to a conflict of law on opposite sides because 
the words used to define an issue will have ramifications one way or the other. 
Regardless of its implications for downstream legal liabilities, the practice of precedent 
 
177 Taiaiake, Alfred. “Deconstructing the British Columbia Treaty Process [Paper in:  
 Indigenous Peoples and the International Sphere” (2001) Balayi: Culture, 
 Law, and Colonialism]. 
 
178 See generally Supra note 27 [Kaushal]. 
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still represents the primary way in which persons, places, ideas, and communities 
become known to the body of common-law within the Canadian state.  
 
In the analogy of gatekeeping as it applies to the use of jurisdictional technologies, the 
legal actors can take the place of the gatekeeper, where the technology itself 
represents the actual gate. In the case of the BCTC process, the federal and provincial 
governments are wary of admitting anything in through that gate that does not fit a 
predetermined size. Once inside the boundaries of law, existing mechanisms have the 
opportunity to attach to notions of liability, injustice, and restitution - meaning that there 
are consequences that overshadow the practice of making a connection with those 
terms and all the antecedent laws that are tethered to them. The challenges faced by 
indigenous peoples in the negotiations with a powerful state entity are often 
understood through other forms of ordering or effect, meaning that they are described 
in their political, social, and economic frames of reference rather than as a piece of 
jurisdictional machinery. The importance of a jurisdictional re-description of the 
encounters is that with the will to change the machinery, the processes can be 
reconfigured and inequalities mitigated. 
 
In contrast the jurisdictional technology of precedent that might limit the negotiations 
at the BCTC process, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights functions in 
a similar way, but with wholly different effect. While the notion of setting a dangerous 
precedent shaped the quality and conduct of lawful relations at the British Columbia 
Treaty process and excluded the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group and aboriginal 
governments from ways of entering Canadian law, the existing use of legal  precedent 
at the Inter-American Commission explicitly allows for the entrance of the HTG to 
international law in order to mitigate those power imbalances that often characterise 
relationships between aboriginal and non-aboriginal governments. The permissive 
aspect of this rule of precedent depends entirely on what has gone before and the 
gatekeepers of the decisions. The entrance of the Hul’qumi’num to international law is 
an example of how the jurisdictional technologies of categorisation and precedent 
crafted that attachment of the HTG to international relations. Having crossed that 
threshold via the admissibility hearings, the case as it is argued by the Hul’qumi’num 
Treaty Group is now part of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and is established, once a decision has been rendered, as a link in that 
chain of stare decisis. 
 
In each case, while the jurisdictional technology remains, in essence, the same, the 
shaping of lawful relations was in turn influenced by the actions of the gatekeepers 
and a pre-existing body of jurisprudence or accepted practice. As mentioned in chapter 
one, a praxis of jurisdiction does not have an ethic biasing it necessarily towards 
inclusion or exclusion, merely one of responsibility towards the conduct of lawful 
relations. It does, however, have vastly different effects based on how it is 
implemented and approached. As Kaushal notes, “This is jurisdiction’s multivocality: it 
looks different in different places and has different meanings in different 
circumstances”179. Despite using the same jurisdictional lens, the outcomes from 
different facets can generate widely different accounts of law. This responsibility, then, 
rests within the offices inhabited by the legal actors.  
 
179 Ibid at 762. 
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III.  The Scaffolding of Categorisation 
 
 
The use of categorisation as a jurisdictional tool can preconfigure the shape of lawful 
relations. An analogous term for this which alludes to that shaping is the term meta-
governance, where the content of a question of law is already decided by the 
jurisdiction in which conflicts are assigned. 
 
This process of categorisation features quite strongly in the BC treaty negotiations. By 
drawing the perimeter around what can and cannot be negotiated, the Crown 
engineers through language the ways of coming into and being with law. Similarly, the 
practice of categorisation within law's domain preordains the kind of relationship 
available to those who make contact with it. In the specific context, the most salient 
and contentious point of legal classification is the insistence by the Crown that any 
lands negotiated at the process must be transferred in the form of fee simple title. This 
specifically precludes a communal ownership of the land, while at once also 
extinguishing any other kind of interest in land. Not only does this classification arrange 
the jurisdiction so as to shape the prospective legal relationship, this particular 
classification of fee simple explicitly negates the possibility other relationships that 
might already exist specific to aboriginal peoples. 
 
Fee simple title to land arrives at the bidding of the Crown. The authority over land 
arrives via that classification through the auspices of the sovereign state and all its 
colonial attachments.180 This is in contrast to the sui generis nature of the actual title 
over the land that is generated if Aboriginal Title is confirmed by the Canadian courts181. 
This insistence that the land be classified as fee simple dictates the kind of legal 
relationship that aboriginal peoples could have with their land. 
 
This type of prearranged legal categorisation determines the way in which persons 
and communities, events or ideas might be attached to the body of existing law. Similar 
in scope is the practice of bracketing uncomfortable notions that is undertaken by the 
non-aboriginal governments. This practice where specific subjects are unilaterally set 
aside and excluded from the prospective landscape of lawful relations also necessarily 
underwrites the type of content and way interacting with law that can enter into a 
negotiation narrative. The processes of categorisation and bracketing define the 
parameters or boxes into which the HTG or any aboriginal government must fit their 
understanding and the articulation of their needs, laws, cultures, and truths in order to 
participate in negotiations.  
 
Unlike the BCTC process, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights does not 
engage in this boxing of content into possible legal outcomes. It does not have the 
same kind of hierarchical structure that contributes to this notion of meta-governance 
where the content is arranged based on the preconfigured jurisdictions. It does, 
 
180 Blomley, Nicholas. “The Ties That Blind: Making Fee Simple in the British 
 Columbia Treaty Process” (April 2015) 40:2 Transactions of the Institute of  
British Geographers168 – 79. 
 
181 Supra note 8 [Delgamuukw]. 
 
 64 
however, have a formalised process, in that admissibility hearing to determine if it is 
appropriate for a case to be brought before the commission is in itself a categorisation 
process, although the outcome is either to be heard or not heard, not to enclose the 
space in which lawful relations are permitted. 
 
At the entrance of the HTG to the domain of the Inter-American Commission, Crown 
representatives attempted similar techniques of bracketing and categorisation to 
exclude various aspects of the case and defend against allegations made by the 
Hul'qumi'num. They categorised the content as either outside temporal jurisdiction of 
The Commission or, as a partial defence to their inaction, the existence of competing 
claims of other First Nations communities to the same land claimed by the 
Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group. None of these attempts to bracket issue were in any way 
successful, however, the only reason that they were not was because there was an 
independent third party to adjudicate these attempts to remove certain portions of the 
Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group narrative from consideration. 
 
This practice of categorisation is perhaps the most apparent use of jurisdiction as a 
tool to preclude certain engagements with law and thereby shape lawful relations. The 
manner in which this can be done depends to some extent on the mechanism for 
authorisation which will be addressed shortly. However, as a praxis of jurisdiction as 
it is applied to the varying contexts in which the Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group finds 
themselves, the technology of categorisation plays a pivotal role in determining how 
lawful relationships are negotiated. This technology can be transformative in what it 
allows or disallows in the way in which it shapes the prospects for engagement 





IV. Authority and Authorisation 
 
 
As previously discussed, any notion that thinking with jurisdiction is precisely split into 
these particular approaches of technologies, authorisation, and inauguration is 
misleading. The practice of jurisdiction is properly a holistic approach applied from any 
multitude of directions to an examination of the ways, manners, and modes of being 
with law. However, the locus of authority and authorisation is when the broader 
questions of jurisdiction become more evident in the shaping of legal interactions. 
 
Within the British Columbia Treaty Commission process, it would not be an 
overstatement to assert the Crown and the province of British Columbia had a vested 
interest in maintaining the dynamics of power that are reinforced by the locus of 
authority vested in the presumption of Canadian sovereignty. That process of 
justification for initial takings when it comes to land claims disputes is where the 
aspects of sovereignty and the politics of colonialism overlay this mechanism of tracing 
and justifying the jurisdiction. The re-enactment of the initial violence of sovereignty 
through the mechanisms of established Canadian law would be the purview of studies 
specific to sovereignty. However, the relationship that authority has with the 
downstream technologies of jurisdiction, and thinking of jurisdiction as a holistic 
practice, it is possible to see how the acceptance of the locus for authority as a 
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reciprocal and reinforcing relationship with other practices of jurisdiction. 
 
Canada has a long-standing policy of not engaging in any legal remedy where they 
are not the final authority for the conduct of law, although with the hierarchy of a 
sovereign state, escaping the crown as the final authority is difficult. By acknowledging 
and accepting the authority of the Crown and all its antecedent legal practices, the 
options for aboriginal governments decrease and are assimilated into the narrative 
and workings of the Canadian system whose founding authority arrives via a denial of 
anything beyond itself. 
 
However, there is more to authority than the power to compel and exclude, although 
that would seem to characterise Canada use of it. Returning to this notion of the 
speech of law and the authority to speak on its behalf, it is evident that within the BCTC 
process the HTG lack both the authority to speak on behalf of a law that is not theirs, 
and the space in which to declare their own. Their only recourse is to challenge that 
mechanism of authorisation that validates the actions of non-aboriginal governments 
and so refused to engage with processes that would only reinforce the authority of the 
Canadian nation-state. 
 
In contrast, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is limited and shaped 
by its authorising mechanism. The remedies available, as with any international 
instrument, are limited to an understanding of the inviolable sovereign state. While the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights might have the space and authority to 
speak in the name of the law, it does not have the coercive mechanism to enforce its 
decisions, as it is authorised via the consent of the member nation states. This means 
that Canada is free to ignore the decisions of The Commission, although it would be 
ill-advised to do so. Nonetheless, the jurisdiction of the IACHR does not practically 
extend to authority over the practices within a sovereign nation.  
 
Nonetheless, the IACHR does represent a mechanism for authorisation that extends 
beyond territorial jurisdiction. The preoccupation with authority that maps precisely on 
to the sovereign state forecloses on the thought that authority might be generated and 
organised in different ways and thereby allow for different ways of belonging to law. 
While the IACHR is configured by the participation of nations within the Organisation 
of American states as consenting sovereign jurisdictions, the use of human rights 
locates the ontological foundations for authorising the decisions both in the consent of 
the governed as it were, but also in the legal and philosophical foundations for the 
human rights dialogue. This extends jurisdiction in a way that is not bounded by 
territorial sovereignty but rather exists in the space in-between. The IACHR is not 
entirely free of sovereignty as a constituent part, however, it can present a different 
arena for processes, places, and events to be tethered to a legal framework that is 
rooted in something partially outside the colonial hierarchies reproduced by territorial 
sovereignty. 
 
The utility of international law as a partial escape from the stranglehold of territorial 
sovereignty can be seen but the comparison between the reinforcing structures of 
jurisdiction through authority in the British Columbia Treaty Commission process, in 
contrast with the different modes of authorisation available through the human rights 
arguments at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. However, the viability 
and effectiveness of a right-discourse based account of indigenous self-government 
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and property rights is one that does not go undisputed. The framing in terms of human 
rights in international law still shapes modes of jurisdiction through the nation-state, 
and the "saltwater thesis" ratified by the UN general assembly established the limits 
of decolonisation whereby only those locations separated by water or geographically 
separate from the colonising power could invoke self-determination.182 Nevertheless, 
the human rights dialogue contributes a platform through which other notions of law 
can be communicated, even if the main categorisation and framing of the inter-
American Commission on Human Rights occurs through the format of the existing 
nation-state. The human rights aspect of the Inter-American Commission as it is 
compared with the informal dispute resolution process of interest-based treaty 
negotiations still indicates that in this case, human rights provides a possible 




V. Inauguration and the Meeting Place of Laws 
 
 
The framing of jurisdiction through inauguration addresses the larger metaphysical 
questions of jurisdiction, and therefore the threshold of law at the limits of its capability. 
This is where jurisdiction takes a step back, so to speak, to re-describe the parameters 
outside of its existence. The implication with aspects of authority and authorisation is 
that it relies on a context where the speech of law can be heard. When querying 
"whose law?”, the answer rests with the authorship that organises the jurisdictional 
mechanisms downstream of its original shaping. The initial moment when law comes 
into existence is where that initial speech of law inaugurates its own existence, 
arguably followed closely by notions of sovereignty – although that formulation is 
somewhat contested. 
 
The acknowledgment of the creation and perimeter to existing law has implications for 
the British Columbia Treaty Commission process as well as the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. The BCTC seems wholly incapable of addressing the 
assertions of law made by indigenous communities despite a well-established history 
of self-government and community structure. In practice, Canadian law seems 
incapable of questioning its own jurisdiction and in this way excludes any prospect of 
a consideration of the different ways of entering in to and belonging to law from 
perspectives external to the sovereign framework. 
 
In querying if law exists in the first place,183 a metaphysical perspective on jurisdiction 
locates this as the first question of law. It is one of the few viewpoints that 
acknowledges the space around law’s terrain, both physically and temporally. By 
doing so it does not pre-suppose the existence of the current legal order, and in the 
case of the IACHR, allows for the presumption of Indigenous ownership in contested 
traditional lands rather than the presumption of sovereign ownership that the 
 
182 Taiaiake, Alfred. “Rethinking self-determination: Lessons from the Indigenous-Rights  
discourse” in Jen Sai eds. The Movement of Movements: Part 1: What Makes Us 
 Move (Oakland, CA, USA: PM Press, 2017) 203. 
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community must disprove or renegotiate.  
 
The description of the space occupied by a legal entity through the widest lens of 
jurisdiction allows for the prospect of creative outcomes to questions of laws existence 
and extent. Overlapping jurisdictions and jurisdictions based on that of ideas rather 
than territory are not automatically excluded from the conception of what it means to 
belong to law and interrogate the mechanisms of attachment and the creation of 




VI. The Conduct of Lawful Relations 
 
 
The practices of jurisdiction configure the shape of lawful relations. The approach of 
thinking with jurisdiction can be divided in a multitude of ways, although in this case it 
has been approached from the technologies of representation, the modes of 
authorisation, and the questions of inauguration. This project has taken the multilevel 
approach of unravelling the progress of one particular case by approaching it from the 
varied perspectives generated by a praxis of thinking with jurisdiction. As a result, If 
Canada is to take seriously an ethic of the responsible conduct of lawful relations, the 
analysis of the jurisdictional machinery that underwrites the domestic processes in 
comparison to the international ones indicates that the jurisdictional mechanisms need 
to be rewritten.  
 
An ethic of jurisdiction is mentioned elsewhere in this text, however an account of the 
conduct of lawful relations is incomplete without acknowledging how that ethic sits in 
relation to the praxis of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction as a critical enterprise is concerned 
with the quality of legal relationships. In order to have a relationship one has to have 
parties to said relationship and a way of making an evaluative judgement about how 
that relationship is manifest. A praxis of thinking with jurisdiction applies a magnifying 
glass to the scaffolding of the living processes that shape lawful interactions. It also 
unveils landscapes of legal thought and practice that underpin how that scaffolding is 
built and implemented. As mentioned briefly in earlier chapters, this praxis does not 
contain within it a judgement about the value of the processes it uncovers. To 
understand the quality of lawful relations, an ethic of responsibility must sit adjacent to 
the jurisdictional methods and acts as a means of evaluating the quality of those 
relationships, which was the avowed aim of the jurisdictional endeavour at the outset.  
 
The salient point in this is that there must be individual or parties in this relationship, 
and beyond that those who participate or mediate and as such they play a key role as 
legal actors or law holders. As we have seen, those who inhabit key positions as 
gatekeepers at the limits of law’s capacity wield a delegated authority vested in their 
office. Beyond the ways in which human beings act towards one another, those 
involved in the legal system are authorised through jurisdictional mechanisms to act 
in the name of the law. This could be judges, government officials, legal 
representatives – all these have the capacity to influence who is added to the body of 
existing law, along with how and to what extent.  It is to this position of responsibility 
that one has to attach an ethic, as these are the authors of the language of law; the 
builders of the scaffolding of legal relationships.  
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It is in this manner that McVeigh and Dorsett attach an ethic of responsibility to the 
office of the jurisprudent when considering the engagement with a jurisdictional 
endeavour184.  Beyond the responsibility vested in the office that each law holder may 
inhabit, the practice of jurisdictional thinking is to consider in its way of thinking the 
scope and humanity of lawful relationships. Dorsett and McVeigh emphasise this in 
the final chapter of their book on jurisdiction, saying; 
 
…the ethic of office has been ordered around the practice of humanising 
law and acknowledging forms of human measure and of common 
humanity. How this is done is as much a matter of acknowledging the 
limits of office as of the acknowledgement of human relations.185  
 
While the ethic of responsibility is not a fully developed methodology as such, as 
admitted by the authors, it achieves the end of pairing the method of thinking with 
jurisdiction with the ability to evaluate and be critical in the sense of discerning the 
flaws within or beyond a system of law when situated within a pertinent context. In this 
instance that context would be in evaluating how the different jurisdictional 
mechanisms and technologies were used – intentionally or unintentionally- by the law 
holder in both the domestic and international spaces. The project has been to add 
texture and a means of evaluating the quality of lawful relations between the Non-
Aboriginal governments of Canada and the Aboriginal Governments and 
representatives of the Hul’qumi’num Peoples. This critical enterprise that is based on 
thinking with Jurisdiction allows us not only to consider how the technologies and 
forms of jurisdiction act to attach persons, places, and events to Canadian law, but 
also to consider the quality of the relationships that are inaugurated or excluded. In 
identifying the inconsistencies that are revealed by paying attention to the jurisdictional 
landscape, it means that there is also a locus from which identify problems and to 
attempt change.    
 
The ethic of responsibility is tightly woven in to the fabric of a praxis of jurisdiction, 
particularly when it touches on authority and authorisation. Thinking about the BCTC 
it is easy to see where the issues lie when authority for the speech of law, which would 
naturally flow from the legislature, is delegated to a representative with instructions on 
what they are and are not allowed to negotiate. This authority to speak in the name of 
the law, but only to a limited extent, means that this office of negotiator as law-holder 
is undermined by the legitimacy of what they are able to execute. And yet, the office 
is one that should encompass all possibilities if the treaty process of negotiation 
between equal nations is adhered to as it is supposed to be. To think jurisdictionally 
about the conduct of lawful relations in this instance is to think about the flow of 
authority through the legal system and the difference between being designated 
authority and given authorisation.  
 
This ethic of responsibility attached to the office of the jurisprudent is aptly located in 
those that speak in the name of the law and who act for those who do. We have 
seen many examples of this and it is in them, as the architect or participant to the 
legal relationship that can ultimately influence its humanity. The ethic of the office of 
 
184 Ibid. 26 
185 Ibid. 140 
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the jurisprudent, while inhabiting numerous manifestations, ultimately in this case 
rests with the Canadian state. While there is arguably an ethic of responsibility 
attached to the legal offices inhabited by individuals, in this case that obligation to act 
in a responsibly manner and be judged accordingly rests inescapably with the 
Canadian government. In 2017 the department of Justice released the Principles 
Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples. Of 
the ten principles outlined by the document regarding Canada’s conduct, some do 
touch on the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and self-government. 
Specific to acting in a responsible manner however number three states that the 
Government of Canada “recognises that the honour of the Crown guides the conduct 
of the Crown in all of its dealings with Indigenous people”.186 This statement, along 
with the longstanding fiduciary relationship that should govern the actions of the 
Government of Canada when it relates to Indigenous Peoples, attaches McVeigh 
and Dorsett’s ethic of responsibly to those who would act on behalf of Canada with 
respect to the relationship to Aboriginal governments.  
 
I would also contend that the Government of Canada has a duty to conduct themselves 
with and ethic of responsibility not just for the jurisdictional consequences flowing from 
those who inhabit the office of the jurisprudent, but also for the conduct of law. I would 
argue that inherent in this ethic of responsibility with respect to the conduct of lawful 
relations is the notion of equality between parties and in law. Given the uneven 
landscape that has been unveiled by this jurisdictional approach to thinking through 
the quality lawful relations, it could be argued that this fundamental inequality is a 
result of the inability of Canadian law to undertake a decolonising task of looking 
beyond itself for sources of law. In that case, equality and an attendant ethic of 
responsibility as it is construed in this context might be interpreted to mean that 
lawmakers and legal actors have a duty to embrace the multicultural heritage of 
Canada. It is evident from the jurisdictional approach in this thesis that the foundations 
for Canadian law do not represent a configuration that enables different notions of law 
in a multicultural Canada. 
 
In comparing the two venues for legal arguments, it is clear that an ethic of responsibly 
is not being adhered to with respect for the conduct of lawful relations within the BCTC 
Process. By removing themselves from domestic law, the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group 
move their arguments for the right to their property within Canada to an international 
forum where the articulation of the existence of aboriginal law, culture, and property 
are given a different texture and are correspondingly heard differently. The inbuilt 
shaping of legal space so as to influence the human relationships that are latterly 
defined by Canadian law make speaking of first Nations laws and territories a difficult 
prospect. Despite the jurisdiction vested in its universal application to human rights, 
IACHR presents clear space in which to create lawful relations because the underlying 
structure does not preclude notions of indigenous knowledge and law. Canada has a 
fiduciary duty in its actions towards first Nations communities, and in that respect it 
would follow that it has a responsibility for its practices and processes. The ethic of 
responsibility attached to a critical approach of thinking with jurisdiction allows for 
commentary on texture and quality of the legal relationships in the language of 
 
186 Canada, Department of Justice, Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s  





Unfortunately, recent authorship raises some doubt as to the ability of those who 
inhabit the office of the jurisprudent to effectively be able to act other than the way in 
which they have been. That ethic of responsibility attached to those who would 
speak in the name of the law does not evolve in to change if the law-holders in 
question are still unable to see the jurisdictional technologies that shape the living 
tree of common law. Jill Stauffer comments that “settler colonial ways of perceiving 
and inhabiting worlds fail to acknowledge and remember and appreciate and honour 
as equal indigenous lives and indigenous ways of world building -and that’s an 
ethical failure with deadly consequences”.187 In speaking of the way in which the trial 
judge in Delgamuukw interacted with the Indigenous narrative with respect to 
understanding jurisdictions beyond his own, she notes that he seemed incapable of 
seeing that “…Modern law is as much of a mythology as is the story of the 
supernatural bear that he cannot make himself hear”188.  
 
The need to disrupt the thought pattern that inhabits western legal practice and is in 
fact what this praxis of jurisdiction is able to do, although the prospect of its utility in 
bringing about that disruption is based on the ability of those participants within the 
legal system to engage with a critical approach to law through thinking with 
jurisdiction. Regardless of the duty vested in those who act as gatekeepers to the 
tree of modern Canadian law, this ethic of responsibility remains unrealized if those 
within the system are not able to think differently about the forms of law they inhabit 




VII. Concluding Remarks  
 
 
Thinking with jurisdiction is a practice of approaching the conduct of lawful relations 
through the ways those relationships are shaped by the underlying architecture of law. 
Because the notion of a praxis of jurisdiction describes the threshold at which bar 
organises and makes contact with persons places and events, these modes of 
jurisdiction can be leveraged to understand the underlying architecture that represents 
the contact point in the shaping of lawful relations either on its smallest scale or its 
largest. Jurisdiction as a critical endeavour addresses the existence and articulation 
of law as well as how it interacts in everyday life. The approach of a praxis of 
jurisdiction does not have a preconceived notion of what the law should or should not 
do. It does, however, have an ethic of responsibility with respect to the conduct of 
lawful relations. In this reading of jurisdiction, that ethic of responsibility is translated 
to the cornerstone of jurisprudence in the equality before the law. 
 
187 Stauffer, Jill. “Can Law Be Fair to Delgamuukw? A Panel on Legal Violence and  
Temporal Resistance in Law Process.” University of Ontario Institute of  
Technology: Technologies of Justice Conference (January 26 2018) Online  
:<http://socialscienceandhumanities.uoit.ca/legalstudies/media- 
hub1/technologies-of-justice-conference---2018/jill-stauffer-can-law-be-fair-to- 
delgamuukw-on-legal-violence-and-temporal-resistance.php>. at 00:05:54 
 
188 Ibid. at 00:10:48. 
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A praxis of jurisdiction has been used to examine the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group’s 
arguments before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Prior to its 
engagement with the human rights discourse, the HTG interacts with the domestic 
British Columbia treaty commission and a contrast is drawn between those two 
processes via the filter of the jurisdictional lands. As the two processes are 
interrogated and compared, it becomes evident that the jurisdictional technologies of 
writing, precedent, and categorisation along with the modes of authority and 
inauguration can be used together to mediate both the inclusion and exclusion of 
persons, places, and communities from the body of law. In this case, these 
jurisdictional processes are being mobilised by the non-aboriginal governments in 
Canada to manipulate the domestic land claims processes and to limit the ways in 
which First Nations communities can belong to existing Canadian law.  
 
Canada's myopic preoccupation with territorial sovereignty and exclusive control over 
the legal process precludes it from considering other ways of belonging to law. In truth, 
the practice of categorisation does a lot of the work of jurisdiction, however, this does 
not exclude the possibility of overlapping jurisdictions, and indeed that already exist 
within existing frameworks. Canada's insistence that there be only one law and one 
corresponding truth is inconsistent with any efforts to engage with honest alternative 
dispute resolution, which should be the hallmark of the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission process. This would indicate that Canada's intransigence is the reason 
for the failure of the BCTC process, and far from engaging with this process in the 
spirit in which it was designed, the jurisdictional technologies and assemblages are 
actually used to reinforce the persistent assumptions of Canadian sovereignty and 
legitimacy. 
 
Given the resounding feedback from academic literature and government bodies alike, 
the government representatives cannot be unaware of the criticisms levelled at the 
domestic process. As it is, Canada's persistence in this vein constitutes a use of 
jurisdictional practice to exclude notions external to the dominant authorising 
structures and enclose other notions of law outside the domain of Canadian 
negotiation, relegating them to categories no longer relevant with respect to 
contemporary negotiations with First Nations governments. 
 
The authorising structure for land claims negotiations and land transfers reinforces 
existing hierarchies and lawful relationships that are shaped by premises that arrive 
through the colonial history of Canada. Despite the capacity of federal and provincial 
governments to inaugurate different jurisdictions and create new ways of belonging to 
law, they have remained silent and unmoved with respect to the creation of 
responsible lawful relationships. 
 
Despite an organising structure that on the face of it is quite contrary to communal 
land ownership desired by the HTG, the human rights language at the IACHR proved 
to be a better platform for the meeting place of laws, mediated by the pre-existing 
jurisprudence that seeks to overcome the colonial assumptions of Crown ownership 
and entitlement. While the international place of the Inter-American commission 
means that it does not have the authority to enforce any of its decisions on sovereign 
jurisdictions, it does make the space for a different articulation of lawful relations and 
a new addition to indigenous land claims jurisprudence in the international sphere. 
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Despite formal mechanisms of coercion, the IACHR can encourage a different 
dialogue between the HTG and non-aboriginal governments so that the laws and 
assertions of the Hul’qumi’num peoples do not go unheard and undocumented. 
 
Despite not finding a way to equitably belong to Canadian law, HTG has found an 
entry point via the language of human rights to an international jurisprudence that 
respects the right of the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group to speak in the name of their own 
law and knowledge. This international sphere can act as a meeting place for laws 
without the overt and covert workings of jurisdictional technologies co-opted to 
reinforce the premises of colonial rule and sovereignty. Regardless of any decisions 
made by the Inter-American Commission, the fact of the speech of law in the utterance 
of jurisdiction adds to the texture of First Nations land claims with respect to Canada. 
The quality of the belonging to international law and the mechanism by which it was 
mediated reinforces the importance of the content and language used by legal actors 
as they negotiate the particulars of belonging to law and what that could mean for 
varying communities. The respect of the international sphere and the jurisprudence 
that assumes indigenous knowledge and law without resorting to an adversarial 
mechanism is imperative to any further shaping of interactions between the 
Hul’qumi’num peoples and the governments of Canada.  
 
Given the actions of the non-aboriginal government representatives, it cannot be said 
that Canada is responsibly conducting a value-driven engagement of lawful relations. 
With the ethic of responsibility and equality in mind, the jurisdictional approach to the 
British Columbia Treaty Commission identifies the way in which the technologies and 
machinery of jurisdiction are used irresponsibly to exclude Indigenous nation building, 
law, governance, and knowledge. This shading of the political precludes the 
jurisdictional mechanisms from reaffirming and enabling full and adequate 
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